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ABSTRACT 
 
BOT scheme method of public infrastructure provisioning by the private sector is one 
of the most popular PPP methods which in most cases is applied as an automatic 
choice without performing feasibility studies. It helps the governments to provide 
infrastructure and services with minimal impact on the governmental budget while 
allowing it to leverage the latest technology and efficient managerial skill that resides 
with the private sector. 
 
The study that was conducted revealed that BOT scheme has a potential of being the 
best modality of if applied properly. This modality has a potential of creating a 
breeding group for corruption at the same time. It also revealed that the application of 
due processes will not necessarily deter corruption, lack of and exclusion of 
important stakeholders such as the citizens. 
 
The findings of the study revealed that the ruling party in the government can abuse 
its power in pursuit of its own mission which will not necessarily be in the interest of 
the public or the other political parties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Declaration          iii 
Acknowledgements         iv 
Abstract          v 
Table of Contents         vi 
List of Figures         x 
List of Tables          xi 
List of Acronyms         xii 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
CHAPTER 1          1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION        1 
1.2 RESEARCH BACKGROUND      6 
1.2.2 Research Context Background     7 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT       8 
1.4 THE AIM OF THE STUDY       9 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES      9 
1.5.1  Primary Objective       9 
1.5.2  Secondary Objective      10 
1.6 RESEARCH DESIGN OBJECTIVES     10 
1.7 DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH      11 
1.8 GEOGRAPHICAL DEMARCATION      11 
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY      11 
1.10 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS      11 
1.10.1  Public Private Partnership      11 
1.10.2 Build-Operate and Transfer     12 
1.10.3 Build-Own-Operate and Transfer     12 
  
1.10.4 Build-Own and Operate      12 
1.10.5 Special Purpose Vehicle      13 
1.11  OUTLINE OF THE STUDY      13 
 
CHAPTER 2          14 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW        14 
2.1  INTRODUCTION        14 
2.2  THE THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK     14 
 2.2.1 Legal and Environmental Factors     17 
 2.2.2 Technical Factors       19 
 2.2.3 Political Factors       19 
 2.2.4 Social Factors        20 
2.3  FACTORS LEADING TO THE USE OF PPP    21 
 2.3.1 Value for Money       21 
 2.3.2 Ex- Post Value for Money Assessment    24 
 2.3.3 Skills Transfer        25 
 2.3.4 Access to Broader Funding      26 
 2.3.5 Risk Sharing         26 
 2.3.6 Enhanced efficiency        28 
 2.3.7 Access to the Latest Technology     29 
 2.3.8 Accounting Treatment      29 
2.4  FACTORS INHIBITING SUCCESS IN BOT PROJECTS  30 
 2.4.1 Risk Assessment       30 
 2.4.2 Bidding Complications      31 
 2.4.3 Game Theory Application       34 
2.5  GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE AND NEGOTIATIONS   35 
viii 
 
2.6  DETERMINING THE CONCESSION PERIOD    35 
 2.6.1 Benefits of Information Sharing     41 
2.7  BOT Project Financing       43 
2.8  SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT     44 
2.9  SUMMARY         47 
 
CHAPTER 3          48 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY       48 
3.1  INTRODUCTION        48 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN       48 
 3.2.1 POSITIVISTIC APPROACH      49 
 3.2.2 PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH     49 
3.3  RESEARCH METHOD       51 
 3.3.1 Literature Study        51 
3.4  THE SAMPLE        51 
 3.4.1 Probability Sampling        51 
 3.4.2. Nonprobability Sampling      53 
3.5  SUMMARY         54 
 
CHAPTER 4          55 
 
IMPERICAL STUDY         55 
4.1  INTROCUCTION        55 
4.2  CASE 1: THE NORTH SOUTH EXPRESSWAY    55 
4.3  CASE STUDY 2: THE KUALA LUMPUR-KUALA SELANGOR 
HIGHWAY          59 
  
4.3 SUMMARY          61 
 
CHAPTER 5          62 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS     62 
5.1  INTRODUCTION         62 
5.2  ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM     62 
5.3 INTEGRATION OF LITERATURE REVIEW WITH IMPERICAL  
STUDY          62 
5.4  RECOMMENDATIONS       65 
5.5  CONCLUSION         67 
LIST OF REFERENCES        70 
 
 
Appendix A:  Intention to Submit  
  
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE    DESCRIPTION      PAGE No. 
 
 
1.1 Types of available PPP arrangements       3 
 
2.1 The bargaining process invited by the government concerned  
 in forming a BOT         42 
2.2 The profile of utility gains by the government concerned and  
 Private Investor         43 
2.3 Accountability of public service providers to citizens (short route)  
 and Via the state (long route)       46 
5.1 The interface mechanism         66  
 
  
  
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE   DESCRIPTION      PAGE No 
 
3.1 Qualitative versus Qualitative Research     51 
4.1 Details of proposals that were considered for further evaluation 57 
4.2 Efficiency comparison between the NSE portion that was  
 Procured through TPM and the portion that was procured  
 PPP arrangement        59 
4.3 Comparison between Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway  
and the East Coast Phase 2      61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa   Asgi-SA 
Black Economic Empowerment       BEE 
Build, Operate and Transfer      BOT 
Build, Operate, Own and Transfer Concession Model   BOTcM 
Build, Operate, Own and Transfer Bargaining Concession Model BOTaM 
Build, Own and Operate       BOO 
Build, Own, Operate and Transfer     BOOT 
Concession Agreement       CA 
Government of Malaysia       GoM 
Malaysia‟s Highway Authority      MHA 
Municipal Finance Management Act     MFMA  
Municipal Systems Act       MSA  
North South Expressway        NSE 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  OECD 
Public Finance Initiative       PFI 
Public Finance Management Act      PFMA 
Public-Private Partnership       PPP 
Public-Private Partnership Investment     PPPI 
Public Sector Option       PSO  
Special Purpose Vehicle       SVP 
Traditional Procurement Method      TPM 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
     CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
All spheres of government including local authorities have traditionally been involved 
in the provisioning of goods and service for the citizens they serve (Cannadi & 
Dollery, 2004). According to Shen, Bao, Wu & Lu (2007); Wibowo and Kochendoerfer 
(2011), Devapriya & Pretorius (2002) and Akbiyikli, Dikmen & Eaton (2011) many 
governments especially in the developing countries, lack in financial resources which 
are imperative in the provisioning of new and/ or maintenance the existing 
infrastructure facilities, infrastructure includes highways, railways, ports, tunnels, 
mass transit, hydraulic structure, bridges, power plants, public facilities and municipal 
facilities. These infrastructure facilities are source of stimulating and promoting the 
national economy, it is therefore imperative that they are adequate and reliable. They 
promote the quality of the citizen‟s life and shape the environment physically, socially 
and politically (Algarni, Arditi & Polat, 2007).  
 
In their work, Cannadi & Dollery (2004) observed a general declining trend in  public 
sector investment levels which in Australia was perpetuated by the constant 
reduction in the budgetary allocations for the local government. In fact that was not 
the only reason according to Algarni, Arditi & Polat (2007), the following are the other 
factors that led to the trend of „privatisation‟ of public infrastructure provisioning 
worldwide: (1) the growing debt of developing countries meant a reduction in the 
borrowing capacity and fiscal budget which was alluded to by Cannadi and Dollery 
(2004) whilst (2) the growth in the economy and population size warranted an 
upgrade of the infrastructure; (3) in the middle 1980s the lending institutions became 
more comfortable in dealing with the private sector than with the government; (4) the 
economic down turn experienced by the oil rich countries around the same time 
(middle 1980s) forced the government to explore creative ways of promoting 
projects; and (5) the development of  a phenomena in the „privatisation‟ of traditional 
public enterprises in a number of countries  whereby the processes of delivering 
goods and services were moved to the private sector since there were arguments 
developing  around the public sector‟s consistent failure in delivering efficient results 
as well as its failure to produce socially equitable results as expected by the 
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community it serves. The problems alluded to above posed a threat to the social, 
economic and political stability and as such have forced developing countries to seek 
private participation in infrastructure development as a means to this end. This has 
resulted in project finance modalities such as BOT/ BOOT/ BOO and many other 
alternatives to be popularly adopted. 
 
Due to globalisation, the popularity of these modalities has recently spread to the 
other parts of the world. In Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries developed countries however, the engagement of private sector 
companies in the provisioning of public goods and services is a practice that was 
long established. In the recent decades, this practice has been on the increase due 
to the growing pressure on the OECD governments to expand and improve the 
quality of infrastructure and to enhance competitiveness and economic growth. The 
OECD governments were automatically pressured to utilise even more of public- 
private partners‟ services to try and meet the demands of their citizens. These 
partners helped them not only to meet the demands of the citizens but to meet them 
in an innovative manner that would ensure better allocation of resources whilst 
providing value for money.   
 
It should however be noted that not all Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
procurements would yield value for money, some will not hence the importance to 
perform the value for money test prior to deciding on the modality to pursue. 
Experience has taught the procuring government departments that traditional 
procurement system is still relevant for some types of infrastructure procurement as 
they yield value for money which would not necessarily be attained with a Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) procurement mode (National Treasury, 2007). The table 
below depicts the various Public-Private Partnership Investment (PPPI) modalities 
that could be employed.  
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FIGURE 1.1 : TYPES OF AVAILABLE PPP ARRANGEMENTS 
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The terms in the diagram above are some of those used in PPP (Delmon: 2010): 
 
 Management or operation and maintenance (O&M) contract – where a private 
entity provides some operation and services for a fee, usually based on delivering 
satisfactory services.  
 Affermage – where a private entity builds and/ or refurbishes and operates a 
service usually delivered directly to consumers. 
  Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Own-Operate- 
Transfer (BOOT), Designs-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Design-Construct-
Manage-Finance (DCMF)- where a private entity finances and build/ refurbishes a 
facility that provides services to a single or small group of large off takers (often 
public utility or directly to consumers (e.g. toll roads). 
 Lease- where the existing asset and/or land is leased to a private entity for 
construction of an asset to provide services to off takers or delivery to consumers.  
 
The real and perceived deficiencies of the public sector gave rise to the need to 
explore modalities of PPPI infrastructure provisioning. Because the public sector is 
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not always equipped to manage project related risks as well as the private sector and 
more often than not does not have the necessary funds to carry out massive 
infrastructure projects, e.g. if a government is to construct an infrastructure, the 
project may be completed later than the scheduled end dated and budget overruns 
may also result. The public sector seldom has the requisite skill to undertake such 
massive and technically inclined projects which thing is definitely not in the interest of 
the public. The use of PPPs emerged as a viable option. By transferring some of the 
project risks from the public sector to the private sector means that the costs 
associated with delays in project delivery and budget overruns will not be borne by 
the procuring government institute but by the private sector appointed to deliver that 
particular project as financial penalties may be instituted thereto if the agreed upon 
standards and timelines are not met (National Treasury, 2007). 
 
 
Cannadi & Dollery (2004) have pointed out that with infrastructure services such as 
roads, water, electricity and gas being typically natural monopolies usually due to the 
initial cost of establishing the operations being prohibitive and the economies of scale 
forming an effective barrier to entry by potential competitors, these barriers have 
inclined policy makers into believing that if the provisioning of public infrastructure 
were to be relinquished to the private sector it would be open to abuse of 
monopolistic power to the procuring government agency. Profit maximising 
monopolistic infrastructure providers could be tempted to exploit their market power 
by supplying goods and services at prices that are not competitive.  In an attempt to 
curb this temptation, the South African government through the department of 
Treasury decided to govern the payment mechanism or sources of funding of PPPs 
through the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) and Municipal Systems Act (MSA) embodied in the 
Treasury Regulation 16 which Acts focus in delivering value for money solutions 
(National Treasury, 2007).  
 
Delmon (2010) posits that there is no universal norm as to the most appropriate 
approach to PPP. He suggests that an analysis be performed on a country-by-
country, sector-by-sector and project-by-project basis to find the right fit for a 
particular project in a particular country as circumstances are prone to vary.  He 
further cautioned that note should be taken that PPPs do not necessarily always offer 
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better value for money solutions to the infrastructure provisioning endeavour 
compared to the traditional method as a result a test has to be performed to establish 
the best mode to be employed i.e. 
 Is the project substantially technical, operational and financial risk transferred to 
the private party? 
 Can the agency afford the envisaged fee? 
 Does the solution offer value for money? (National Treasury, 2007) 
 
In South Africa, PPPs are an important service delivery mechanism in that they can 
facilitate rapid infrastructure service delivery as proposed under Accelerated and 
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (Asgi-SA), with Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) being important factor for attaining social objectives (National 
Treasury, 2007). Types of projects that are usually suitable for PPPs are those of 
provisioning very large assets with ample scope to allocate clearly identifiable risks to 
the private party. These projects may be procured at any government level i.e. 
national, provincial or local (municipal) level (Araujo & Sutherland, 2014). The 
process of providing the public facility by private consortium is very complex, risky, 
sophisticated and ultimately, expensive.  
 
In comparing the definition of the three contractual alternatives i.e. BOO, BOOT and 
BOT it was noted through the help of Algarni, Arditi & Polat (2007) that the 
disadvantages of BOO was that since the infrastructure asset is owned and operated 
by the private sector, it could be difficult for the government to aid private 
organisation in owning the public facility even if the intention is to promote the welfare 
of the public. Also, the government would have to particularly attend to the welfare of 
the public where the operation of the facility has to change hands from one operator 
to the other, the government entity would have to ensure that the incoming operator 
has is au fait with the system‟s characteristics and that the new in-charge is 
thoroughly trained. There generally are problems with public regulation of private 
investment or production. BOOT projects on the other hand although much similar to 
BOT projects they differ in that the service bears in addition to financing, constructing 
and operating the investors own the asset upon completion bearing the risks and 
rewards associated with the ownership thereof (Arndt: n.d ) which part investors tend 
to avoid. BOT projects have become so popular that many agencies and investors 
have in the recent past have pursued BOT projects without studying in depth the 
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feasibility of the proposed project prior to obtaining financing, starting the planning, 
design and construction.  Algarni, Arditi & Polat (2007) pointed out that there are a 
number of instances where such a practice has led to the suspension or even demise 
of critical projects and bankruptcy of contracts involved. In order to develop a 
successful BOT project, its promoters need to confirm that that project planning takes 
place within an enabling environment, it has the necessary political support and a 
buy-in from key stakeholders is obtained. Also, the project has to be socially, legally, 
economically, environmentally and financially viable (National Treasury, 2007). A 
plethora of work has been done on the alternative variants of private participation in 
infrastructure development. This paper will be looking at the factors that sometimes 
lead to projects that are being procured through this popular modality to fail or delay. 
 
1.2  RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Governments usually lack the necessary funding for the much needed infrastructure 
facilities to help stimulate their economies. To ensure that the already scarce 
resources do not go to waste, the procuring entity needs to in deciding on the 
modality to procure infrastructure asset or service perform a value for money test. 
The modality that proves to be cost effective between TPM and PPP would be the 
one employed. Prior to considering the PPP as a delivery mechanism to be followed, 
managers of the procuring entity need to ensure that an enabling environment is 
created at the project planning stage and that the necessary political buy-in 
supporting the project is obtained (National Treasury, 2007). Salman, Skibniewski & 
Basha (2007) believe that an accurate and yet detailed feasibility study is the only 
means of ensuring project viability. In performing the feasibility study, both qualitative 
and quantitative decision factor are required especially for a large scale infrastructure 
project which study is usually expensive, requires thoroughness and can take a 
relatively long time to be properly completed. In the past governments used to 
heavily rely on the consultants that belonged to the private sector to perform the 
feasibility studies on PPP projects. Those who were charged with that responsibility 
of performing the study had a tendency of focusing mainly on the qualitative decision 
factors as they are easier to work with and ignored the qualitative decision factors. 
These studies as they were based on limited and subjective decision factors usually 
brought about undesirable outcomes. The much needed crucial projects with a great 
potential of succeeding would be eliminated or even neglected since these kinds of 
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studies produced limited information to help conclude on the viability of the project 
and thus resulting in loss of potentially viable project opportunities. The neglect in this 
aspect was attributed to the popularity of BOT projects at the time, the perceived and 
real advantages led to a number of governments and private companies to pursue 
BOT projects without performing any detailed feasibility study of the proposed project 
before to embarking on them. Many projects were thus aborted, suspended and even 
went bankrupt consequently. This statement was supported by Salman, Skibniewski 
& Basha (2007) based on their previous studies that they have performed which 
indicated that many BOT projects that failed to be completed or that were suspended 
was as a result of lack of detail in their feasibility studies and consequently 
insufficient information to conclude on their viability e.g. during the past two decades 
in Egypt only 9 of twenty five (25) projects that were announced projects were 
awarded and the rest have been suspended. Salman, Skibniewski & Basha (2007) 
opined that the challenge that the decision makers were faced with was in 
responding to the following questions: (i) to what extent is the project viable, (ii) what 
are the enabling conditions needed and the steps to be taken to improve the project‟s 
viability (National Treasury, 2007). It is against this backdrop that the study seeks to 
investigate possible factors that could have led to the death, abortion or failure of 
some of the infrastructure projects that were undertaken through the much loved 
BOT concession option. 
 
1.2.1  RESEARCH CONTEXT: BACKGROUND 
Gauteng province being one of the largest economies in South Africa; in terms of 
Gross Provincial Product (GPP), it generates approximately 38% of the country‟s 
economic activity. During the past ten (10) years this province has experienced an 
increased level of growth in population influx, housing, industrial needs and 
consequently high volumes of traffic. The economic activity has also grown in the 
same direction but unfortunately the transport infrastructure did not expand to equate 
with the other variables at play (Aurecon, 2014). Traffic thickened and thus slowed 
down as existing roads could not accommodate the volumes to an extent that a 70 
kilometre distance from Pretoria to Johannesburg or from Pretoria to the OR Tambo 
International Airport would take about two hours to cover during peak hours. This 
situation had a negative impact on the socio economic fabric of the province and 
consequently of the country. It is for this reason that the government undertook to 
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implement the infrastructure projects that were aimed at increasing the capacity of 
the road infrastructure with the aim of easing the traffic congestion which would 
consequently improve the commuters‟ quality of life; stimulate the economic growth 
and consequently positively impacting the environment. 
 
The form of transport infrastructure provisioning that was utilised for this purpose was 
a combined system of construction by private firms with public ownership and 
operation of the infrastructure asset which is referred to as the basic system by (Van 
Wel & Quiggin: 1998). In the press release of greater growth with Public-Private 
Partnerships in Infrastructure 2012, the chairperson of NEPAD Business Foundation, 
Stanley Subramoney mentioned that the South African government has declared 
2012 a year of infrastructure with the view that the build programme will help alleviate 
poverty, inequality and unemployment. He acknowledged the shortage of skill as a 
major challenge for the government to roll-out the build programme. He is of the 
opinion that a partnership with the private sector would attract the requisite skill as 
well as the required funding thus making it imperative for the government to prioritise 
the partnerships. Good PPP projects would achieve win-win outcomes especially 
when the public agencies are clear about the type of services and infrastructure and 
service needed to satisfy the needs of the citizens in a particular sector National 
Treasury (2007). Globalisation has made it easier for countries to trade meaning that 
with well-articulated public needs, the players in the private sector could form a 
consortium that offers the best mix of skills at a reasonable cost, that skill could be 
sourced locally or imported. This paper will investigate the causes of BOT projects 
failure.  
 
1.3  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
In its endeavour to ease traffic congestion, the South African Gauteng (Provincial) 
Government introduced a high-speed train known as Gautrain as an alternative form 
of public transport that will be available in short intervals and would carry as many 
people as possible to different destinations in the shortest possible time. The 
Gautrain did not take care of the problem alluded to above in its entirety because: (1) 
its fares were exorbitantly priced thus excluding the masses who rely heavily on 
public transport such as trains, buses, taxis and lift clubs; and (2) it did not cover 
some of the areas that are covered by the conventional public transport thus forcing 
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Gauteng commuters to catch public transport in order to access their destination 
points (thus rendering the Gautrain irrelevant for this market). The congestion 
problem did as a result not evaporate but instead remained more or less that same. 
The government then felt the need to effectively address the problem by widening the 
roads and building new bridges where necessary through a concession type system. 
Theoretically, concession projects present a win-win-win solution for the economy, 
the public and private sector partners with the opportunity to earn higher returns (Ho 
& Liu, 2002 in McCowan & Mohamed, 2007).   
 
As a concession model, BOT has made a significant contribution in the provisioning 
of infrastructure worldwide, especially in developing countries. It has managed to 
stimulate and develop economies of most countries. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the factors that could have led to the failure death or even abortion of 
some of the BOT projects.  
 
1.4  THE AIM OF THE STUDY   
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the possible factors that cause the BOT 
projects not to succeed since BOT is the most popular modality of PPP infrastructure 
provisioning. The research builds on the theoretical framework presented and 
investigated the variables identified in the literature. No interviews will be carried out 
as this is purely an article, it will be purely based on literature review which will be 
informed by journals, newspaper articles, postings on the internet as well as 
secondary empirical studies. Recommendations will then be after evaluating the 
plethora of written material.  
 
1.5.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
1.5.1 Primary Objective 
 
According to Akbiyikli, Dikmen & Eaton (2011), Wibowo & Kochendoerfer (2011) and 
Devapriya & Pretorius (2002) many governments especially in the developing 
countries, lack in financial resources which are vital for providing new and/ or 
maintaining the existing infrastructure facilities. It is imperative for the for these 
infrastructure facilities to be adequate and reliable as they are the source of 
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stimulating and promoting the national economy. The financial constraints alluded to 
above have forced developing countries to seek private participation in infrastructure 
development. This has resulted in project finance modalities such as BOT/ BOOT/ 
BOO and many other alternatives to be popularly adopted. Much work has been 
done on the alternative variants of Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI), this 
paper seeks to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of BOT as an alternative for 
public infrastructure provision, in order to offer a balanced argument, this paper will 
be looking at the impact of modality on the pertinent economy as well on the 
procuring government entity.  
 
1.5.2 Secondary Objectives 
 
- The nature and importance of PPP 
-  Factors influencing the effectiveness and efficiency in infrastructure delivery 
-  Strategies to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in infrastructure 
procurement order to improve agility 
-  How the procuring organs manage their relationships with the PPPs to 
enhance the competitiveness/ independence 
 
1.6  RESEARCH DESIGN OBJECTIVES 
 
In order for this study to achieve its objectives, the following research was pursued: 
- Conducting of secondary literature review so as to gain an in depth understanding 
of the variables at play and to formulate a balanced argument of views by different 
researchers. 
- Conducting a secondary literature review with the view of collecting data for the 
study 
- Perform a Secondary Empirical Study 
- Analyse and make a deduction of the results 
- Interpret findings and draw conclusions 
- Make recommendations based on the results obtained above  
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1.7  DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The research is demarcated to make the research topic more manageable from the 
researcher‟s perspective. The exclusion of certain topics does not imply that there is 
a lesser need for their research.  
 
1.8  GEOGRAPHICAL DEMARCATION  
 
The study is not limited to the Gauteng province nor is it limited South Africa but 
would consider other countries where similar procurement schemes were utilised.  
Just a brief reference will be made to make the study manageable. 
 
1.9  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.9.1 Research Paradigm  
 
1.10 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
 
1.10.1 Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
 
A Public, Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between the public agency and 
private party, where: the private party performs an institutional function and/ or uses 
state property in terms of output specifications; a substantial project risk (financial, 
technical, operational) is transferred to the private party; and the private benefits 
through: unitary payments from government budgets and/or user fees. The main 
objective of PPPs globally is to ensure the delivery of well maintained, cost-effective 
public infrastructure or services, by leveraging private sector expertise and 
transferring the risk to the private sector (National Treasury, 2007).  
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1.10.2 Build- Operate and Transfer (BOT)  
 
It is a type of a contractual agreement where the government affords the private 
sector the right to finance, build and operate an infrastructure project. In turn, the 
private sector has the right to cash flow operations over the concession period. Upon 
the expiration of the concession period, the private sector company transfers the 
control and the asset ownership to the government agency, hopefully after recouping 
its costs and achieving profits. At that point the government may either decide to 
operate the asset by itself or put the operation there of up for another round of 
bidding (Van Wel & Quiggin Chen, 1998; Akbiyikli, Algarni, Arditi & Polat,2007, 
Dikmen & Eaton, 2011, De Marco et.al. 2012 and Chen, Lin & Wang, 2012, Yu, Lam 
& Yung, 2014). 
 
1.10.3 Build-Own-Operate and Transfer (BOOT) 
 
(Akbiyikli, Dikmen & Eaton, 2011 and Gbadegesin & Oyewole, 2014) It is one of the 
most risky project delivery schemes in that the management of a BOOT project starts 
with the identification of risk factors resulting from inherent characteristics of the 
project itself and the risk-factors resulting from exogenous factors. An implementation 
is then put in place to avoid the risk, mitigate the risk, diversify the risk or allocate the 
risk to the party who is best able to manage it. A BOOT project is similar to a BOT 
project in that the asset it transferred back to government at the end of the 
concession period and usually at no cost. It differs from BOT projects in that in 
addition to financing, constructing and operating the concessionaire bears the 
responsibility to design the structure and own the asset upon completion bearing the 
risks and rewards associated with the ownership thereof (Arndt: n.d ) 
 
1.10.4 Build-Own and Operate (BOO)  
BOO schemes, also known as divesture have the ownership and control of the 
infrastructure asset fully transferred to the private sector indefinitely with no obligation 
to return them to the government (Akbiyikli, Dikmen & Eaton, 2011). BOO schemes 
are privately owned and operated (Van Wel & Quiggin, 1998: 69). 
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1.10.5 Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) 
 
A Special Purpose Vehicle is a separate legal entity created by equity partners to 
manage a special project to help minimise the risk of investors and help preserve its 
own credit standing (Algarni, Arditi & Polat, 2007 and Akbiyikli, Dikmen & Eaton, 
2011). 
 
1.11 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the scope of the study, 
problem statement, research objectives, the research methodology employed to 
arrive at the conclusion of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 comprised a literature review on strategic infrastructure provisioning 
purchasing and supply, determining factors that influence the choice of infrastructure 
provisioning mode and the methods of efficiency and outlining the methods of 
improving effectiveness and efficiency thereof. It discusses strategies that can be 
employed to inform the decisions/ choices that would result in value for money.   
 
Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology used for the investigation which 
includes the research paradigm.  
  
Chapter 4 entailed the interpretation and summarised empirical results of the study 
and the implications thereof. 
 
Chapter 5 integrated literature reviews with the results of the secondary empirical 
study performed in chapter 4, made recommendations and concluded accordingly.  
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 CHAPTER 2  
 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework of BOT schemes that will assist in 
better understanding of the elements that hinder progress and also indicate how to 
create an enabling environment in which BOT projects thrive. The theoretical basis in 
this chapter will assist in making recommendations on how to make BOT a 
successful alternative for private provisioning of public infrastructure in chapter 5. 
 
2.2  THE THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
According to Arndt (n.d) the government has a responsibility to develop the natural 
resources which are within the sphere of its political domain to their maximum 
utilisation thereby leading the country towards growth and development. It has 
always been a tradition for the government to develop infrastructure, this tradition has 
gradually been changing through the years. Recently, the private sector also referred 
to as investor or concessionaire has increasingly been given more opportunities to 
develop infrastructure on behalf of the owner (public agencies or government) not 
only because of their access to vast amounts of capital that can help the public 
sector which usually has constrained governmental budget (especially in the 
developing countries) but also because management in the private sector is more 
effective than in the public sector. PPP engagements provide a mechanism for 
government to leverage the private finance and management skills, thus enabling the 
government to build more infrastructure assets without additional funds (Shen et.al, 
2007) while taking advantage of the plethora of latest  and innovative technology and 
skill that resides with the private sector.  
 
The application of a BOT contract system in developing public infrastructure has 
made a fundamental contribution in the provisioning of infrastructure worldwide, 
especially in developing countries and regions. This is because according to Shen 
et.al, ( 2007) it provides an effective mechanism to mobilise private funds and 
leverage the innovative and current technologies, management skills and operational 
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efficiencies found in the private sector. In the UK, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) 
was especially introduced to curtail fiscal constraints that the country was faced with 
in the 1990s (Chang, 2013). De Marco et.al (2012) posits that PFI has been 
recognised as an effective institutional mechanism of facilitating private finance and 
leveraging the private sectors‟ improved quality and efficiency in delivering huge 
projects. It creates an environment that allows for the development of desirable 
constructed facilities with minimal budget spending on the part of the government. 
Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) included to this list the inability to quantify and price 
the project risk, general complexity of some projects and the strength of public sector 
unions. When the unions feel that the jobs of the employees are threatened by the 
PPP they tend to pull their muscles and do everything possible to ensure that the 
projects do not take off and a traditional procurement method be used instead. They 
tend to overlook the other factors that are mentioned above which the government 
sector is not in the position to handle. 
 
In applying the BOT system, government usually encourages the private sector 
organisations to form consortia in the form of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) that will 
finance, design, build and operate the infrastructure asset upon completion for a 
specific period of time that the government and the investors would have agreed 
upon prior to the engagement (National Treasury, 2007 and De Marco et.al, 2012). 
This period known as a concession period is granted to enable the investors to 
generate revenues by running the infrastructure. More detail will be given on the 
determination of the concession period later in this chapter.  
 
According to Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) and Araujo & Sutherland (2014), the 
government always identifies the need and the infrastructure asset to be procured 
prior to selecting the procurement modality to be employed. Traditional Procurement 
Method (TPM) is usually a default option and requires that if a project takes the PPP 
route, the proposal be justified as to why the TPM is not a preferred option. It is the 
responsibility of the cabinet ministry to establish the availability of funds within the 
government‟s multi-layered budget estimates to cater for the envisaged project. The 
ministry plays an important role of gate keeping which may relate to (i) determining 
the size of the project, (ii) determining if the project will deliver value for money, (iii) 
whether in the development of the project, proper procedures have been followed 
and, (iv) the assessment of whether or not the project is in line with the original 
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budget appropriation. The procuring agency and the finance ministry/ parliament may 
also have to approve specific PPP and TPM projects whose approval is in addition to 
the regular annual budgeting process.  
 
(Chen, Lin & Wang, 2012 and Khan, Sharif & Rehman, 2012) consider PPP to be an 
important vehicle for resolving the public sector‟s problems of limited budgetary funds 
with regards to developing public projects and inefficient public projects. Seasoned 
developers who are self-disciplined and efficiently organised could help in the 
prevention of abuse and degradation of common resources given a chance to 
manage public enterprises. Araujo & Sutherland (2014) pointed out that the option to 
deliver infrastructure through PPPs has its risks since: (i) there is no guarantee on 
the  benefits of the private sector; (ii) The project outcome is determined by the  
identification of the most efficient bidder; (iii) the use PPPs as a means to circumvent 
budgetary pressures could lead to inappropriate PPPs, (iv) the investment 
undertaken by means of a PPPs is excluded from the public budget and accounting 
records; and (v) the impact of large contingent liabilities on the long-term fiscal and 
macro-economic sustainability  and financial burden that would be transferred to 
future generations. It is therefore imperative to carefully evaluate the fiscal 
implications when deciding to procure an infrastructure asset through PPP and make 
proper assessment of its merits vis-à-vis TPM.  
 
(Araujo & Sutherland, 2014) the option to deliver infrastructure through PPPs is also 
intricate and very costly. Because the infrastructure facilities are vital for the host 
country‟s economic development, (National Treasury, 2007) advises that their 
feasibility study to be confirmed prior to embarking on the project. It is very 
unfortunate that the increase in the perceived and real advantages of BOT 
contractual system (Khan et. al, 2012) has driven many governments and private 
sector companies to pursue BOT projects without performing an in-depth study into 
the feasibility of the proposed project prior to implementation, this trend was 
perpetuated by the effect of globalisation.  A detailed feasibility study helps in 
determining the viability of the project. It is usually costly and time consuming to 
perform a detailed feasibility study of large scale projects as it includes a larger 
number of qualitative and quantitative factors as a result agencies tend to short 
circuit the process. Failure to perform such detailed feasibility study has led to most 
projects being suspended, bankrupt and other times to the abortion of the critically 
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needed projects (Salman, Skibniewski & Basha: 2007). The promoters of the BOT 
project need to ensure that the project is politically, socially, legally, environmentally 
and economically financially viable in order for it to be a success (Salman, 
Skibniewski & Basha, 2007 and National Treasury, 2007). Stakeholder consultation 
is the other critical factor that determines the success of the project.  The 
engagement of the stakeholders is very critical especially important stakeholders like 
the citizens who would be expected pay tolls at the end of the project. There is a 
general tendency of excluding citizens from the decision making process and then 
shift the PPP costs to them in the end (Chen, Hubbard & Liao, 2013). In order to 
ensure the success of the project and to make a concession period profitable for the 
investors, the citizens need to be continually engaged so as to obtain their buy-in.  
 
BOT infrastructure projects have the potential to generate financial incomes and are 
conductive to national economic development. This is made possible by the different 
objectives of the parties at play i.e. the PPP with the objective to maximise profits 
and the government that is concerned with socio economic benefits (Yen & Tiong 
2007) the word potential is used as there is no absolute assurance can be 
guaranteed on the delivery of the project, all projects carry with them some form of 
risk which can impede their successful execution or operation. Because investors 
have to recover their investment costs from the operating the infrastructure asset, 
they are therefore not only concerned about the expected future earning potential but 
are also concerned about the risk factors that influence the earnings over time hence 
the importance of feasibility study prior to undertaking the project. Yen & Tiong 
(2007) opined that the return on investment should be reflective of the compensation 
that is -required for the risk exposure i.e. the higher the risk of earning, the higher the 
returns should be.  
 
The following are the feasibility decision factors to be considered prior to accepting or 
rejecting the potential project: legal and environmental factors, technical factors; 
political factors and social factors.  
 
2.2.1  Legal and environmental factors  
 
Legal and regulatory environment should be conductive of BOT project application 
(Chen & Messner, 2005). Governments in developing countries need to assume an 
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active role which is inclusive of the creation of the macro investment environment 
that is conducive to private participation in order to promote the application of BOT 
and should also accept responsibility and coordinate projects. A relevant example is 
the Shanghai project in China where the Shanghai local government made official a 
circular on Dachang water plant administration. Because there was a speculation on 
the supply and off-take responsibilities of utility companies, to confirm its commitment 
to the project, the local government provided the concessionaire with a letter of 
support and also helped in facilitated financing of that project in addition to that, a 
regulation was issued that spelt out the responsibilities of various government 
subsidiaries in concession granting, raw water supply, off-take, dispute resolution 
and compensation. In their work, Algarni, Arditi & Polat (2007) a survey performed in 
the local municipalities across the USA revealed that some municipalities 
encountered legal obstruction while implementing BOT since it was not a commonly 
used delivery modality; they felt that it needed a special legislation by Governments. 
 
In Pakistan on the other hand, expatriates were kidnapped, local stakeholders 
working in other provinces within the country were also kidnapped and the provisions 
of the law and order facilities became difficult as the population increased on a daily 
basis (Khan et.al, 2012) which led to stifled mobility which consequently threatened 
the completion of the projects. 
 
BOT project usually overlap on a number of laws and regulations with each regulator 
operating at times under conflicting policy constraints e.g. in a road construction 
project there will be servitude to clear, roads planning, comply with the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Act, macroeconomic planning, foreign investment policy, land 
administration, etc. The government agency should ensure that a pre-packaging of 
approvals thus removing any approval uncertainties by providing a clear regulatory 
path which reduces the on-going regulatory risks that could be daunting to the 
investor and also delay the start or completion of the project. In their work, Chen & 
Messner (2005) revealed that although a bulk of the burden was removed in this 
fashion, residual problems in the approval system were complex in that the tendency 
of government organs to issue approvals in a sequential order as opposed to parallel 
approvals. This could have a large impact of the project schedule. This paper 
recommends that a policy be introduced to allow flexibility in the approval structure. 
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2.2.2  Technical Factors 
 
According to Araujo & Sutherland (2014) the particular attraction of the PPP concept 
lies on the asset construction and the operational phases being performed by the 
same agent. These two aspects induce the private partner into considering the 
asset‟s long term performance. They posit that the quality concerns of the project are 
better addressed with PPP than they are with TPM. Countries with inadequate skills 
and human resource to build special infrastructure assets tend to take advantage of 
globalisation and thus benefit from expatriated specialised engineering skills in the 
form of project managers and team leaders (Khan, Sharif & Rehman, 2012). 
 
The prerequisite of BOT projects management is to derive the project scope and 
budgets within the given time frames. Khan, Sharif and Rehman (2012) posit that 
issues emanating from quality/control, drawings, coordination, technical 
specifications and contracts play a significant role in the success of BOT project 
implementation. These skills lie with the private sector as they are highly specialised 
and differ from one project to the other. It may prove expensive for the public sector 
to acquire such skills as they are costly in nature and also differ from one project to 
the other. Acquisition of such skills would then mean that after the completion of the 
project, the employee becomes redundant as their skills will not necessarily be best 
suited for the next project if any (National Treasury, 2007 and Araujo & Sutherland, 
2014).   
 
2.2.3  Political Factors 
 
BOT projects are of much concern to the citizens and politicians alike. citizens are 
weary of government officials who make deals behind their backs. Algarni, Arditi & 
Polat (2007) noted that project delivery methods as BOT can be easily misinterpreted 
if not thoroughly explained by the procuring agency that is expected to have a better 
understanding of what it is getting itself into. In order to eliminate that 
misunderstanding and to ensure a buy in of the public, politicians who seek to 
incorporate the voters‟ concerns in the procurement process tend to avoid supporting 
delivery modalities that they may have limited understanding of. Li, Akintoye, 
Edwards & Hardcastle (2005) noted that the existence of a close relationship 
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between politics and the development of public policy. They noted a positive 
correlation between the political attitude towards private sector involved in an 
infrastructure project and growth or demise in the PPP in question. Positive support 
would help in making the projects thrive whilst an inadequate support would pose a 
great risk to projects.  
 
Excessive political interference could lead to bureaucracy and unnecessary delays or 
even death of the project. Tsukanda (2013) made reference to the China National 
Highway Development Programme phases I, II and III where phases I and II were 
delivered at an impressive speed. In the study performed by Khan, Sharif & Rehman 
(2012) it was established that historically in Pakistan due to political instability, the 
financing of the construction that would be running at the time would be stopped 
soon after a change of ruling party at either provincial or federal government level or 
both and that threatened the success of BOT projects. It was also established that a 
number of expatriates kidnapped thus deterring foreigner to work in Pakistan. 
Foreigners were not the only ones whose lives were at stake, local stakeholders 
working in other provinces within the country were also kidnapped. The provision of 
law and order facilities was difficult because population was forever increasing and 
the enforcers of the law were not increasing at the same pace. 
 
2.2.4   Social Factors 
 
Social support is another determining factor in the success of PPP projects. It is 
based on the acceptance of the concept of private provision by the public. In their 
work, Algarni, Arditi & Polat (2007) a survey performed in the local municipalities 
across the USA revealed that some municipalities were met with opposition from 
citizens because they knew that such projects although funded by private money, 
those investments will paid by themselves directly or indirectly through taxes.  
 
When the project is supported by the citizens, the localisation of the project could 
bring with it numerous benefits. The cost of the project could be significantly reduced 
through local procurement (labour and material) so will the delivery time and 
consequently the project will be delivered within the set timeframes. The local 
economy would benefit from the relationship and more local citizens would be 
employed. The Shanghai project (Chen & Messner 2005) is a good example as upon 
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completion of the project there were 65 local staff members employed to operate the 
plant and the head of operations was the only expatriate left, his role was to offer 
technical support where needed and to impart skill so that at the end of the 
concession period the locals are in a position to operate the infrastructure and attend 
to technical problems with minimal dependence on the manufacturer. This 
environment was made possible by the policy requirement of Thames Water. 
 
A wholly owned BOT project would mean that the local government and subordinate 
enterprises would be excluded from sharing profits generated from the project hence 
governments insist on JV projects. Chen & Messner (2005) argued that wholly owned 
often reduce attractiveness of BOT projects to local governments as they are inferior 
to JV structures in terms of skills transfer and job creation for the local citizens. It is 
for this reason that the South African government has a Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) policy to ensure that technical skills are 
transferred to local companies and that local citizens‟ economic situations are 
improved through employment in such projects (National Treasury, 2007). The use of 
locally manufactured equipment and materials help reduce costs of acquisition as 
well as replacement cost. The operating efficiency is increased as the waiting period 
is drastically shortened as opposed to waiting for imported parts. 
 
The lack of stakeholder engagement, especially important stakeholders like the 
citizens as mentioned above usually lead to the failure of a PPP project that would 
have otherwise been successful. In their work, Khan, Sharif and Rehman (2012) 
established that the expatriates in Pakistan were kidnapped and that hindered the 
successful completion of most of the BOT projects.  
 
2.3 FACTORS LEADING TO THE USE OF PPP 
 
2.3.1  Value for Money 
 
In deciding whether or not to procure through the traditional procurement method or 
through PPP, a value for money test needs to be performed and the quality of service 
being produced be considered (Arndt, n.d). If the comparison of providing 
infrastructure or services through PPP shows to be more cost effective than if they 
were to be provided by the agency, the difference between the two is called value for 
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money. Should the opposite be true it would then not be cost effective to pursue PPP 
(Arndt, n.d and National Treasury, 2007) as such a pursuit would not yield envisaged 
results. According to Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) governments around the world 
are increasingly using PPP to pursue value for-money. Value for-money should be 
the driving force behind traditional infrastructure procurement meaning that any 
project be it a PPP or a TPM procured project should be subjected to the value-for 
money test prior to being undertaken only if it creates value for-money and will 
contribute to the greater good of the community will it be considered. The increase in 
the utilisation of PPP by OECD countries has been more pronounced since the early 
2000s. It should be noted that even though PPPs could yield superior solutions to 
traditional public procurement through their innovative technical solutions and better 
allocation of resources, PPPs can offer a superior solution to TPM as well as value 
for money that does not automatically mean that that PPP contracts will necessarily 
always be superior to TPM. Araujo & Sutherland (2014) suggest that PPPs be 
subjected to the cost-benefit analysis in relation to TPM when determining the 
efficiency, effectiveness and economy of solutions that they offer in order for them to 
give that reasonable assurance that benefits will reaped upon their delivery of 
infrastructure, the net benefits should be calculated using the whole life cycle 
approach. 
 
The results of a survey conducted in 2010 by Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) where 
questionnaires were distributed to senior PPP finance ministry officials in 31 
countries. A total of 22 countries responded, 20 of the 22 countries indicated that 
they use PPP in their countries at government level. 13 countries pertain to the 
national / federal government i.e. all levels, national, provincial and municipal level 
PPP constitute 5% and 15%. South Africa uses between 5% and 10% of the public 
sector investment. Public sector investment in infrastructure constitutes 5% to 10% of 
PPP project procurement with 15% being the maximum (Australia and Korea). 
 
The research conducted revealed that Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Korea, Spain, United States and South Africa carry an ex ante 
process both for PPPs and TPM to ensure value for-money. 
 
+ simply because the government officials are more comfortable with the traditional 
method that they have been using for years and not that it yields better value for 
money than PPP. They have become accustomed to the traditional method that it 
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has become simpler for them to create and does not require as much as rigour as the 
PPP where procuring entities are required put together a public sector comparator 
(PSC). The survey results indicated that more countries required PSC than they did 
cost-benefit analysis as it is easier to perform than the cost benefit analysis/ value for 
money test so, the TPM would be an automatic choice in most instances. The 
decision to procure through PPP has been largely driven by champions inside 
individual agencies. Once an agency decides to procure through PPP, they would 
perform a value for money analysis and use the results thereof to support their 
decision. It should be noted though the comparison of one project to the other without 
performing detailed tests may lead to misleading result, ideally the value-for money 
assessment should be carried out for all the envisaged project with varying intensity 
based on the nature and size. 
 
Once a decision has been made to procure a project using the PPP method, the 
proposal would be compared to a PSC. Thus, all prospective PPP projects would be 
measured against an alternative Public Sector Option (PSO). However, prospective 
TPM projects are not compared to PSO having said that, it should also be noted that 
an alternative PSO is not necessarily always viable since the government with has 
limited resources cannot be expected to credibly forecast the range of innovative 
designs and risk management procedures which competing private partners can 
invent. Hence, there is sadly is no credible scope for government agencies to create 
a Public Sector Comparator. As mentioned above, prior to being undertaken, a PPP 
project needs to demonstrate its technical and financial viability. The demonstration 
of technical viability may be relatively easy, but the financial viability evaluation 
according to Ho & Liu (2002) may be more complex and challenging, mainly due to 
the uncertainties involved that are concomitant to the project scale and long 
concession periods. If implemented successfully, BOT has a potential of yielding win-
win results. 
 
In determining the financial viability of the project, the Net Present Value (NPV) is 
considered the most superior method above all the traditional capital budgeting 
techniques such as the Pay Back Period, Accounting Rate of Return, Internal Rate of 
Return and the decision tree as it is believed to be more aligned to the firms‟ main 
objectives which is to maximise the shareholders‟ interest/ value. The financial 
viability calculation tends to be tricky where risk factors associated with uncertainty 
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need to be incorporated into the investment. In as much as the NPV uses the 
discount rate to adjust for risk, the NPV as a determinant of value for money is 
inadequate in that if calculated using risk, any further risk adjustments made by 
decision makers which alters the original NPV if calculated using the risk, it will not be 
in a position to fully capture the additional risk as it considers any additional risk as 
double counting (Ho & Liu, 2002).  
 
Ho & Liu (2002) noted rigidity as the major limiting factor with NPV as a value for 
money determinant, this technique does not allow management to alter their 
decisions when circumstances change which may have a significant impact on the 
outcome, it either captures them partially or completely ignores them is either not 
able to fully capture them. The same sentiments were echoed by Ashuri, Kashani, 
Molenaar, Lee & Lu (2012). The managerial flexibility creates asymmetric payoffs 
that coincide with payoff of the stock call options as given in  
F [ST, T= Max (O,ST-X)]  
Where f = option value  
 ST= stock price at time T; and 
 X = the exercise price 
It is for this reason that the modern financial theory prefers the option pricing 
framework theory for pricing complex investments with uncertain asymmetric payoffs.  
 
2.3.2  Ex-Post Value for Money Assessment 
 
In as much as the ex-ante value for money assessment is necessary for determining 
that the project will deliver value it is however according to Burger and Hawkesworth 
(2011) not sufficient to yield the results and thus propose that a further factor to be 
taken into consideration when performing the value for money assessment i.e. ex-
post value for money assessment. These assessments are measured against 
specific pre-specified performance benchmarks which are usually defined for each 
project either at their commencement or during their life-time. They suggest that the 
frequency and extend of these assessments may differ between TPM and PPP. 
 
In determining integrity elements that may Influence the choice between PPP 
Procurement and TMP, the OECD (2009) in Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) 
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developed a toolbox to help enhance the integrity of public procurement with the view 
to contribute to the improvement in value for money in projects. Those elements are: 
 Post award risk assessment of financial viability of contractors; 
 Limit on the size of the project; 
 Project risk indicators (quantifying risk); 
 Guidelines for risk allocation (between owners and investors); and 
 Provision for estimated risk in the budget submitted to parliament 
The government retains more risk in projects procured through TPM compared to 
PPP but the point is that where the risk is shared like in PPP projects, the 
government might benefit from identifying those risks.  In the studies performed 
previously, it has been proven that PPP outperforms TPM in terms of costs and 
overruns with costs being the most significant (National Treasury, 2007 and Burger & 
Hawkesworth, 2011) as government may not have adequate skill that is found in the 
private sector. The procuring agency may not have the necessary resources to deal 
with the high levels of constant maintenance and service delivery, something that 
makes the PPP more attractive. 
 
In most countries TPM is opted as a default modality since it is an ancient method 
that the people are comfortable with and is less demanding, not that it produces the 
results. PPPs on the other hand are treated as “frills” to the procurement option due 
to their novelty. 
 
2.3.3   Skills Transfer 
 
When considering the provision of infrastructure through PPP Delmon (2010) & 
Burger (2011) posits that the decision to adopt PPP should either emanate from a 
political level or be sufficiently politically supported. Once the political support is 
secured the next step is to ensure that the decision legally, institutionally, and 
regulatory supported to an extent which the agency have the required skills and 
resources to create an enabling environment for the project. It should also be 
established that the finance and commercial markets have the required capacity and 
appetite to enable the PPP project to thrive. Salman, Skibniewski & Basha (2007) 
recommend that once this is out of the way, the next logical thing to do would be to 
the most viable commercial and financial structures. The cost of the project should be 
determined, the financial viability, the nature of private participants and government 
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agency actors, sources of finance, commercial arrangements and all other factors 
that are pertinent to the design of the appropriate PPP structure. According to Khan, 
Sharif & Rehman (2011) in order to ensure that the PPP transfers skills to the local 
community and to the agency the agency should form a Joint Venture (JV) with the 
PPP as opposed to having a pure Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) where locals do 
not have to partake in the provisioning of the infrastructure asset. 
 
2.3.4  Access to Broader Funding 
 
Because the infrastructure projects in their nature are generally large, private 
companies usually form a consortium to undertake the types of projects. The 
consortium usually comprises funders (debt and equity providers), sub-contractors 
and a range of advisors including technical, financial and legal advisors. Private 
partners can raise funds in many forms from equity and mezzanine debt and a range 
of bonds to which the government has no access. The debt providers are usually 
banks and may include other capital market instruments such as bonds or 
subordinated debt. Equity providers would often include sponsors of contractors, 
pure equity investors may also take part in infrastructure provisioning (Shen et.al, 
2007, National Treasury, 2007, Burger & Hawkesworth 2011 and Arndt, n.d).  
 
The access by private partners to broader funding extends beyond their boarders as 
they are able to seek funding internationally. By using structured finance, private 
partners are more able to spread the project risk and because they assume the 
financial risk, they are therefore motivated to provide a high level of service within the 
budget since a good return on investment is dependent on the quality of service 
delivered (National Treasury, 2007). Also, because of the high interests that loans 
attract the private partners are incentivised to complete the project within the budget 
and on time as well as in line with the standards. 
 
2.3.5   Risk Sharing 
 
According to Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) and OECD (2008) PPP partners deliver 
service in such a way the service delivery objectives of the agency and the 
effectiveness of this alignment on the appropriateness and adequacy of the risk 
transferred to the private sector in order to achieve the best out of a PPP 
arrangement, Araujo & Sutherland (2014) suggest that the risks involved should be 
shared between the agency and private partners and effectively. They also 
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highlighted that optimal risk allocation can be achieved when risk is allocated to the 
party who is best suited to manage it e.g. the construction risk to be allocated to 
contractors since they are responsible for the actual construction they will be better 
placed to manage it. Since governments are generally risk-averse and would 
welcome any form privatisation that would help divorce them from the risk that is 
related to the running of a project. They would rather focus on what they do best i.e. 
regulatory and community facets of the industry. Arndt (n.d) warned that 
governments should be cognisant of the fact that rational private companies will only 
accept risk in return of expected rewards. It is therefore logical and efficient that the 
government retain the risk that it can best manage. 
 
Liou & Huang (2008) posit that PPP sponsor takes all the financial risks during the 
project preparation and throughout the project cycle because the public sector is not 
always best equipped to manage it. It is not in the public interest for the completion of 
the construction processes to be delayed or for the budget to be overrun. The 
transfer of such a risk from the public sector to the private sector means that the 
costs associated with the delays will not be borne by the procuring public agency 
instead, penalties relating to budget overruns and non-compliance to the agreed 
upon standards could be instituted against the private sector (National Treasury, 
2007). 
 
According to Ye & Tiong (2007) when allocating the risk, not only should the risk 
appetite be considered, the ability absorb it as well as the incentive to manage it 
should be taken into consideration. In order to reduce the overall costs, risk should 
be appropriately and sufficiently allocated. The decision of each participant is 
dependent on the trade-off between the risk and the associated returns. Given that 
each party to the contract have their concerns and objectives, it is logical that they 
will each have varied risks and trade-offs. Chang (2013) posits that the objective of 
privately financed projects has evolved from being just limited to timeous completion, 
within the allocated budget, in conformity to technical performance standards and 
specifications to include the delivery of value for money and to operate efficiently. 
The essential ingredient to ensuring the attainment of these objectives according to 
Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) is the allocation of appropriate and sufficient amount 
of risk. They pointed out that to best manage the risk entails being able to prevent the 
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risk form realising (ex-ante) or to best manage the results of the realised risk (ex post 
risk management). 
 
In principle, both TPM and the PPP involve the private partners. The difference 
between the two methods of procurement is the risk allocation and the role of 
efficiency driver. In the case of PPP projects, the transfer of the appropriate type and 
sufficient amount of risk transferred is crucial to the success of that project. The risk 
transferred to the PPP under the traditionally procurement method is very limited and 
usually does not extend beyond the construction phase of the project e.g. penalties 
for late delivery (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011 and Gbadegesin & Oyewole, 2014). 
Given the expertise and diligence of the private sector in handling projects, the 
private participants are most likely to appreciate the risk associated with the project. 
The does not exonerate the public agency from its part of the project risk e.g. 
demand risk which according to National Treasury (2007) is very difficult to forecast 
with precision or to control for that matter hence agencies the compensation by 
government agencies through government subsidies to make up for the shortfall the 
interest rate risk and cost risk are some of many other risks that fall within the ambit 
of the government/ agency (Cannadi & Dollery: 2004). 
 
In the late 1990s the UK government procured a National Physical Laboratory 
through PFI so as to shift to the risk the private sector and to keep the project liability 
off the government‟s balance sheet. The procuring government entity saw to it that 
enough was done to off load as much risk as possible on to the private participants. 
The risk allocated seemed to have been managed at a glance but in hind sight the 
contractual agreement had loopholes. The government entity transacted in bad faith, 
the fixed-price design-build contract was designed to insulate it from the exposure to 
construction risk. It turned out that the protection offered by a fixed-price contract had 
a finite limit and the government became exposed to opportunistic behaviour of 
contractors as well as flawed concession (Chang, 2013). 
 
2.3.6  Enhanced Efficiency 
 
In order to capitalise on cost and time saving, private sector companies tend to 
employ innovative construction techniques, public sector agents on other hand being 
risk averse, tend to provide highly detailed specification to contractors which stifle 
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their scope of innovation. This has often resulted in projects being delivered late and 
project overruns incurred (Burger & Hawkesworth, 2011 and Arndt, n.d). 
 
The acute skills shortage in South Africa has a track record of project delivery has 
necessitated the utilisation of the private sector to supplement the in-house where 
specialised skills are required. The contracted private sector company is in turn 
required to transfer appropriate skills to the procuring agency (National Treasury, 
2007).  
 
There is a general belief that with proper competitive incentives private partners 
would be more efficient and effective at delivering most services than the public 
sector. These efficiencies are as a result of greater accountability and financial 
discipline of private sector. Private sector organisations are profit driven and have a 
strong motive to maximise shareholder value. 
 
2.3.7   Access to the Latest Technology 
 
Most of the private sector organisations that provide infrastructure services are large 
in size and are often multinationals. They have access to larger funds which the 
government agencies don‟t, the latest technology and have acquired extensive 
experience in infrastructure operation. They have access to operating philosophies 
and patented technology that could be made available to the government if 
contracted to develop a project. Arndt (n.d) opines that the quality of services 
rendered by the public sector could be improved through the involvement of private 
sector organisations through JVs which will ensure the transfer of imported skills to 
the locals. 
 
2.3.8  Accounting Treatment 
 
Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) pointed that the difference in the accounting treatment 
for projects procured under the TPM and those procure under the PPP could 
influence the decision of the project delivery modality to be employed. Under the 
TPM the liability incurred to procure the infrastructure asset will be reflected in the 
books of the procuring government agency whereas if the assets are procured 
through PPP, the associated liability will not be accounted for in the books of the 
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procuring government agency. The false impression created by this accounting 
treatment to the effect that the government does not pay for asset(s) at all could 
create a false hype. The problem with failure to record the liability creates a risk that 
future payments and contingent liabilities may be ignored in the subsequent years 
when they fall due. 
 
2.4   FACTORS INHIBITING SUCCESS IN BOT PROJECTS 
 
2.4.1  Risk Assessment 
 
BOT arrangements are characterised by a range of risk profile whose management 
could make or break the project. The success or failure of the project is to a large 
extent influenced by degree to which the various project risks are managed. 
Important steps involved in managing the project risks are: risk identification, risk 
assessment and risk response. Thomas, Kalidindi & Ganesh (2006) have warned 
that the application of conventional risk assessment methods on the privatised 
projects may not yield the envisaged results as such projects tend to have complex 
risk profiles such as a very long life cycle with many country and sector specific 
factors. What complicates the assessment of risks is the absence of past data on 
similar risk. Kokkaew & Chiara (2010) are however of the opinion that project 
managers do always have opportunities to take remedial action wherever possible so 
as to minimise the risk impact. 
 
Operating risk and construction risk can be construed as two major risk categories of 
a BOT project. Construction risk includes revenue risk, refinancing and debt servicing 
as they depend on the completion date of the construction work. The operation risk is 
major in that it is concomitant to the future cash flows generated by the project during 
the concession (Ho & Liu 2000). 
 
Constructions are characterised by uncertainties which include but not limited to: red 
tape and political bureaucracy which may lead to schedule delay, risk of cost overrun 
and technical difficulties. These and operating risks are the risks experienced after 
the initial investment costing has taken place and are not considered by the 
traditional capital budgeting techniques such as the NPV. Projects that were rated as 
less risky may due to technical simplicity end up with their costs doubled. Simulation 
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and sensitivity analysis could be used to assess these risks but Thomas et.al (2005) 
warned against their use due to the absence of reliable probability density functions 
for many input variables and also for their interrelationship. Abbel-Aziz & Russel 
(2006 in Kokkaew & Chiara, 2010) were also not comfortable with the risk models 
that were in use as they considered only deterministic construction scenarios and 
neglect any uncertainties during the construction process and these uncertainties 
could have high financial impact that could in turn affect the completion of the project. 
 
2.4.2  Bidding Complications 
 
It is imperative that the promoters of a BOT project have a duty to establish that (1) 
sufficient political will exists for the envisaged project and (2) that project is supported 
legally, socially economically, financially and environmentally to create an enabling 
environment that will help it thrive. (Salman, 2007 and Skibniewski & Basha, 2007), 
as mentioned above, the viability of the project may only be determined through a 
detailed and accurate feasibility study. Since the feasibility study of large scale 
infrastructure project includes a large number of qualitative and quantitative decision 
factors, the study is usually expensive and needs extensive factors and a relatively 
long time to be properly completed. In the past the government used to heavily rely 
on project feasibility studies prepared by private consultants. The determination of 
the project‟s feasibility is not an easy task. The cause of high failure rate in BOT 
projects is as a consequence of decision makers being comfortable with qualitative 
than quantitative decision factors and basing their analysis mostly on them and thus 
ignoring crucial quantitative decision factors which have just as great impact as the 
qualitative if not more. These unbalanced analyses have a tendency of leading to a 
potentially viable project being aborted (UNIDO 1996 in Salman, Skibniewski & 
Basha, 2007). Skibniewski & Basha (2007) confirmed this by stating that in the past, 
many BOT projects failed to be completed or were suspended due to the inadequacy 
of information that was made available to conclude on the viability of the project. It is 
believed that the decision makers have major challenges with answering the 
questions relating to: (1) the extent of the project‟s viability and (2) the conditions and 
remedial steps to be taken to improve the project‟s viability? 
 
Despite the procuring government agency establishing principles and criteria in 
soliciting the best proposal, some developers use this platform to deliberately bid with 
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incomplete information so as to win the tender whilst other use this platform submit 
complete information detailing their experience in the related projects, their 
qualifications and demonstrate their ability to deliver the project. The facts that are 
susceptible to concealment are the costs and financial structure, the technical 
problems in running the project and the ability to assume liability and in some 
instances the ability to deliver on the project (Chen, Lin & Wang: 2012). Bidders 
would always like not only to impress but also to win the tender just like they did in 
the Taiwan High Speed Rail Project. Bidders bid on projects that talk to their strategic 
and business plan and as such bidders would have varied strategic and tactical 
objectives which are not known to the investor. Such lack of knowledge is a limiting 
factor to the owner and thus precludes him from using the Game Theory as a 
predictive model. The rights and obligations of PPP participants can be complex at 
times.  
 
These bidders tend to combine costs, periods and profits and thus present overly 
optimistic data in their bidding quotations. This strategy often win them bids based on 
incomplete information since they did not include some of the external factors which 
had they included would have put them in a different position. It‟s only after the 
contract has been signed that they would want to renegotiate the contractual 
conditions by asking for subsidies for deficit or budget amendments, loan guarantee, 
government investment or even asset purchase. At this point it is usually difficult for 
the government to re-advertise the tender as there is a lot of time and money 
involved in the process. The contractor who negotiated in bad faith would then 
become the ultimate beneficiary. This is one of the major reasons that cause 
infrastructure projects to suffer over spending (Chen, Lin & Wang: 2012). 
 
The High Speed Rail BOT project in Taiwan is an epitome of such bidding. The 
China High Speed Rail Corporation (CH) and Taiwan High Speed Rail Corporation 
(TH) were part of the bid for the High Speed Rail (HR) project in 1997. Even though 
TH‟s price was higher, it was awarded the contract. Soon after the signing of the 
contract the Taiwan financial market experienced a financial crisis that altered the 
Taiwan financial situation. All financing banks did not have the risk appetite for the 
HR project as its risk was determined to be too high. The banks would only consider 
issuing loans to TH only on condition that upon premature termination of the contract, 
the government guaranteed to purchase all TH‟s assets and first compensate the 
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financing banks then pay excess to TH. The contract had to stipulate that, should the 
government revoke the construction permit or management licence of TH it would 
purchase the hardware currently under construction or operation. The strong credit 
guarantees required by the banks was as a result of the project financing concept 
being to the banks and the general public (Cheng, 2010). The role of the banks was 
never clearly defined as a result the government had to secure a lot of risk. The 
government ended up offering loan guarantees and also more than $13 billion as 
initial investment to TH. This left a sour taste in the mouths of the general public they 
felt that the government was not only against the spirit of PPP they questioned the 
government‟s corruption of unreasonable guarantee and subsidies. Little did they 
know that the government was held hostage. 
 
After the high speed rail had begun operating, TH gradually introduced a number of 
trains running the same route, it offered discount tickets as a strategy to pick the 
business up. In 2008 a year into operations, HR experienced a $2.1 billion loss which 
was almost 65% of HR‟s capital because the number of passengers which was 
predicted to be 202 500 per day actualised at 85 000 per day amounting to $0.7 
billion income which was 72.2% less than the projected $26 billion. The financial loss 
experienced by HR led to cash flow problems and bankruptcy for TH. TH had to 
rethink its future competition strategy. The Non-governmental Council Planning was 
even of the opinion that the government should take over as it was not well operated.  
 
Cheng (2010) opined that the trust relationship between the government and TH was 
never successfully established. Not only was the government accused of 
bureaucratic red tape that was responsible for causing delays in many government 
run projects , it was also accused for the lack of transparency in the due process as 
well as corruption, hence the questioning of trust relationship. It is crucial to have 
contracts and laws in place so as to help in curbing moral hazards and promote clear 
transparency and also, to clearly distinguish rights and obligations.  
 
If the principles of the Game Theory were to be applied in the above case, TH would 
have to adopt the cooperation strategy and the contract would have to be re-
negotiated. TH would have to abandon the project and allow the government to 
guarantee the purchase of HR assets as suggested by the lending banks so as to 
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ease the financial crisis and for the government to maximise profits (Chen, Lin & 
Wang 2012). 
 
2.4.3  Game Theory Application 
 
The purpose of applying the game theory to the bidding process is to get the best out 
of bidders. Each competitor develops a concept with input and review from the 
owner, which concept then becomes the contractor‟s basis for the bid. The process 
could time consuming and could add time to the project thus extending the 
completion dates. In a high risk, high cost project the understanding of the 
contractors‟ proposals is an accepted trade-off for the end result. Ho (2006) argued 
that the game theory analysis assumes that everyone is smart and rational; as a 
result any bidding strategy aimed at outsmarting the other bidders will not sustain 
especially where the strategic objective of the all bidders can be inferred by their 
competitors. Everyone in this game plays an open card and historical information 
could be used as a good predictor of the future, competitors will then be better 
positioned to second guess each other‟s mark up and can thus better position 
themselves in terms of competitive pricing without compromising quality. Had the 
same been applied to the Taiwan High Speed Rail Project the government would not 
have found itself in the predicament that it had because the game theory addresses 
the flaws of the current bidding process. 
 
2.5   GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES AND NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Government may issue guarantees to a PPP project when it no longer viable or when 
the risk associated with the project is too high to be undertaken by private parties (Ho 
& Liu, 2002 and Yu, Lam & Yung, 2014). Ho & Liu (2002) indicated that the non-
viability of the project will reflect in the banks unwillingness to offer loans without 
government guarantees just like it happened in the Taiwan High Speed Rail above. 
The debt guarantee is a liability to the procuring agency and an asset to the private 
party providing the infrastructure asset. It would therefore be crucial for the private 
party to revalue the investment with the loan value as failure to do so would lead to 
undervaluing of such an investment. According to Ho & Liu (2002) the private party 
has an option to negotiate should for government rescue in the event negative events 
occur during the construction process but Nasirzadeh, Khanzadi & Alipour (2014) 
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indicated that also when the private party is faced with demand risk during the 
concession period, government rescue could be negotiated. Araujo & Sutherland 
(2014) however maintain that the demand risk should remain with government when 
it is the procurer of the service that is being provided by the private sector as its 
actions and policies affect the demand levels. If the debt guarantee is too large in 
relation to the project cost, the government would have over subsidised the private 
party. It should be borne in mind that a successful negotiation could prevent a failing 
project from bankruptcy. 
 
2.6   DETERMINING THE CONCESSION PERIOD 
 
The other important factor in the implementation of the BOT type contract is 
determining the concession period. The concession period defines the time span in 
which the investor(s) has the right to commercially operate the infrastructure facility 
prior to transferring it back to the owner which is the government (Shen et.al, 2007, 
Wu et.al 2012 and Yu, Lam & Yung 2014). The length of the concession period 
affects both the owner and the investor alike. The longer the concession period is the 
more beneficial it is for the investor and that could mean loss of revenue to the owner 
i.e. the public entity concerned as it may attract more operational and maintenance 
costs which would bring about financial risks even when transferred back to the 
owner. Too short a concession period on the other hand would not be attractive to 
potential investors and may lead to the rejection of the contract or inflated toll fees 
during the operation of the infrastructure asset so as to recoup investment and also 
to make some profit. The end users will be the ones who suffer the consequent 
financial burden (Shen et.al, 2007 and Nasirzadeh, Khanzadi & Alipour, 2014). A 
reasonable concession period is therefore beneficial for both the concessionaire and 
the owner as it would help alleviate financial risks for both parties (Yu, Lam & Yung, 
2014). It can also protect the interests of both parties and thus contribute to the 
success of a BOT project.  
 
The concession route has never been a smooth one, numerous challenges have 
been encountered in the past that originate from the unforeseeable risks and 
uncertainties that are associated with long concession periods. There is a need for 
continual improvement by PPPs through lessons learnt from past experience and 
from exchanging notes (networking). There is a common practice that is applied 
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globally where the procuring agency fix the length of the concession period and let 
the potential concessionaires bid toll rates and other project aspects and guarantee 
the concessionaire a certain level of Internal Rate of Return on Equity (IRRE)(Zhang, 
2009). This practice induces failure of contracts and sometimes renegotiated 
contracts which brings with it undesirable results. 
  
According to (Yu Lam & Yung, 2014) in practice, the successful concession projects 
are those which the length of the concession period is determined by the 
concessionaires based on the expected return on investment by using payback 
period method. Authors like Shen et al, 2007 tend to differ with this view as their work 
has indicated that a concession period that is negotiated by both parties in good faith 
tends to be the one that yields results that are conducive for a successful BOT 
project. Zhang (2009) himself acknowledged the need to develop a methodology for 
informed concession period that will overcome the abovementioned deficiencies. He 
suggests that the least NPV of revenue method to determine the concession period 
for toll roads so that the concession period is internally adjusted to demand 
realisation. The question then would be how would the concession periods for the 
other projects be determined?  
 
In order for the project to be attractive to the potential investors, the concession 
period needs to be long enough to enable the concessionaire to recover his 
investment and to make some profit. In his work, Zhang (2009) observed the 
following with regards to the infrastructure projects in Hong Kong: since the 1960s 
five (5) large tunnel projects have been developed namely: East Harbour Crossing 
(EHC), Cross Harbour Tunnel (CHT), West Harbour Crossing, Route 3 Country Park 
Section and Tate‟s Cairn Tunnel. The CHT had realised its 30 year concession 
period and was transferred to the Hong Kong government. Of interest was that the 
Hong Kong government had set for each of the five projects a predetermined period 
at 30 years and had specified this as a must criterion that the concessionaires had to 
satisfy. Bidders had to bid on the other aspects of the project namely: (1) financial 
and general; (2) land and engineering; and (3) operation and transportation as the 
concession period was not negotiable. 
 
Van Wel & Quiggin (1998) argue that in most cases, the government is capable of 
dealing with the risk involved in large-scale infrastructure projects and the reason of 
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co-opting the private sectors in infrastructure development being the apportionment 
of the other risks involved i.e. cost risk, interest rate risk and demand risk among 
others. The annual cash flow of the concessionaire start after the project has been 
completed and the tunnel/ highway is open for traffic. The estimated revenue of the 
concessionaire is based on tolls collected from the traffic, the toll rates for different 
categories of cars are predetermined in the initial concession agreement and may be 
subject to revision thereafter (Ashuri et.al, 2012). Even though the tunnels varied with 
regards to physical length, design capacity, traffic demand, construction time, 
construction costs, construction complexities and the financial instruments deployed 
their concession periods were fixed at 30 years for each of the projects. Yu, Lam & 
Yung (2014) pointed out that the determination of the concession span can be a 
daunting exercise as it incorporates various influential factors. One would wonder as 
to what influenced the decision by the government to fix all projects at 30 years. 
Varying outcomes were experienced on each project as their circumstance also 
varied. CHT experience financial boom, it yielded unexpected results. It was able to 
pay up its debt within 5 years into the concession period whereas the pay off period 
was projected to be 10 to 19 years. The following are the factors attributed to its 
success: (1) the Actual Traffic Demand was much higher than expected at 125% 
more than the projected Average Traffic Demand in year 1, in the subsequent years 
grew to 100 000 and 120 0000; (2) the interest rate was projected at 6% to 8% and 
yet it stabilised at 5%; (3) the devaluation of the sterling in 1967 and 1976  eased the 
payment of the sterling denominated debt; and the CHT was a convenient route for 
most of the road users. The government had to apply a Toll Revenue Cap (TRC), a 
mechanism used for sharing revenue surplus (Ashuri et.al, 2012) because the 
investors‟ revenue cannot be more than the total revenue of the project‟s economic 
life. 
 
On the other hand, EHC experienced revenues that were far less than projected 
since its opening in 1989 due to lower than expected traffic flow. The actual traffic 
demand turned out to be 48% less than projected upon opening, it grew from 20 800 
to only 22 000 whilst it was projected to grow to 120 000 in 1997. From 1997 to 2006 
it only grew to 44 0000 thus incurring annual revenue shortfall of HK$4,983 million 
over this period of. The WHC did not have it easy either and has since decided to 
hike it tolls for different vehicle categories with effect from 2008. The reasons that 
were established for the failure of the two projects were: (1) the fact that the three 
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tunnels were competing against each other for traffic yet the CHT was the most 
convenient route for most of the road users in that between 2004 and 2006 and CHT 
experienced a 36% increase in the actual traffic demand as opposed to its 
competitors who were experiencing a demand trough; and (2) the increase in EHC 
and WHC toll fees led to a 15.9% drop in traffic demand for both crossings. These 
unexpected increases led to social problems as the commuters could no longer 
afford the tolls, some had to alter their lifestyles by moving to public transport or 
cancelled vehicular trips. Ashuri et.al (2012) suggested that when the project is 
suffering operational loss as result of poor demand forecasts, the government 
support could be requested in sharing the risk of overestimated revenues through 
minimum revenue guarantee (MRG). This form of support is afforded the 
concessionaire when the actual revenue is lower than anticipated as Nasirzadeh, 
Khanzadi & Alipour (2014) suggest that the total revenue of the project in its 
economic life should not be less than the minimum expected investment return of the 
investor. This paper suggests that the government offer MRG to the South Africa‟s 
Gauteng e-tolls where the majority of users are reluctant to pay and only a few are 
paying thus far less than expected revenues are generated because Araujo & 
Sutherland (2014) maintain that the demand risk should remain with government 
when it is the procurer of the service that is being provided by the private sector as its 
actions and policies affect the levels of demand. It is reported that the district 
councillor even contemplated filing a lawsuit against the EHC, some legislators called 
on the Hong Kong Government to take full responsibility of all tunnels than to place 
reliance on the private sector. Akbiyikli, Dikmen & Eaton (2011) have warned against 
issuing government guarantees blindfolded as they could present unmanageable 
levels of exposure (1) because of their size in relation to the government‟s balance 
sheet and (2) because their contingent nature implies the possibility of sudden and 
substantial obligations that are due over a short space of time. 
 
Of grave concern was the fact that the regularity framework remained impervious and 
weak, contractors and lenders had to rely on the terms of the contract as a security 
(Chen & Messner, 2005). The problems encountered by EHC and WHC could be 
traced back to the methods that were employed in assessing the financial viability of 
the BOT projects. Such failures are not unique to Hong Kong Mexico, Hungary 
Thailand and other countries have their own stories to tell. Unrealistic and /poor 
assumption in estimating toll revenues which were used in BOT financial viability 
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assessment, inadequate and inappropriate risk sharing mechanisms that were 
employed between the public and the private sectors were the  major attributes to 
failure during the operation (concession) period, posited Ashuri et.al (2012).  
 
It should be emphasised that there is no once size fits all framework. Traditionally, 
the discounted cash flow (DCF) and the deterministic net present value (NPV) have 
been used to evaluate highway PPP projects. These methods are inadequate in they 
fail to capture and treat uncertainties of the future traffic demands. NPV is not in a 
position to address the impact this risk and the opportunity sharing options. The NPV 
approach is therefore not the right tool to measure the value of the of these 
government support options. A more reliable valuation method is needed to avoid 
under-over investment in BOT projects (Ashuri, 2012). In reality, there is no tool that 
can accurately measure future demands and thus there is a dire need for the 
development of nondeterministic methods valuating BOT projects as the projects 
where NPV was used for decision making have suffered creditworthiness or solvency 
problems like the ones above. 
 
In their earlier work, Shen et.al (2002) In Shen et.al (2007) and Wu et.al 2012 
developed a BOT concession model (BOTcM) in an attempt to establish a 
reasonable concession period that would protect the interests of both the procuring 
agency and the investor. The model presented a cash flow and proposed an interval 
for the concession period negotiation between the government and the private sector 
party. Two critical points being: (1) starting point of the interval aimed at protecting 
the interests of the private party; and (2) the end point of the interval protecting the 
interests of the host government. The first critical point was determined by the 
principle that the NPV of the project‟s cumulative net cash flow during its concession 
period. This negotiation is in fact bargaining and has been proven in the research 
performed by Yu, Lam & Yung (2014) that there in fact is no clear method for 
determining the length for each concession item. A BOT framework cannot be a 
subject of copy and paste, even if successfully tested in other countries or projects 
within the same country, it must be adjusted to accommodate the existing political, 
legal, economic, social, legal, and technological environments of that particular 
country where it is to be applied. In the event it is to be applied within the same but in 
a different project, circumstances surrounding that project need to be taken into 
consideration when adjusting the framework (Chen & Messner, 2005).  
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It is against this backdrop that Shen et.al (2007) developed a BOT bargaining 
concession model (BOTaC) which is based on the rationale that a reasonable 
concession span shall protect the basic interests of both the owner and the investor. 
This model assumes that both parties act with rationalism that each player aims to 
maximise his interests in the bargaining process. Chen & Messner (2005) and Khan, 
Sharif & Rehman (2012) opined that since BOT is a non-zero sum game between the 
two parties complementary capabilities, a win-win result should therefore be the 
basis for the two parties with varied objectives to work together and serve each other 
with equal effectiveness. Binmore et.al 1986 in Shen et al (2007) pointed out that 
rationality has two essential elements namely; (1) complete knowledge of one‟s own 
interests and; (2) flawless calculation of what actions will best serve those interests. 
 
Concession projects are a complicated approach to a long term acquisition of public 
works and services. The design of concession periods is crucial to financial viability 
of PPP projects, which involves the determination of length and incentive schemes 
(Zhang, 2009). Although the lump sum bid system for BOT delivery projects has 
become a global favourite for complex, high risk, high cost and logistically challenged 
project all of which have high bidding costs. It must be pointed out that however 
popular, the BOT contract delivery system framework has been slowly evolving due 
to the knowledge that is passed at a slow rate within the industry due to reluctance of 
the owners and contractors to share the lessons learned and knowledge gained 
through the use of the system. Ho (2006), hence the importance of the rational 
behaviour in BOTaC model.  
 
With rational behaviour, each party will perform calculations and reasonably make a 
comparison of all the logically possible outcomes for the protection of their own 
interests and identify strategies that can best serve these interest, bearing in mind 
that the owner of the asset would receive the residual income and bears that residual 
risk associated with the asset (Van Wel & Quiggin, 1998). The following are the rules 
to the bargaining game: (1) the strategy should be available to each player; (2) it 
should be possible for each player to calculate their pay-offs using different 
strategies; and (3) each player should be a rational maximiser (Nash 1950 in Shen 
et.al, 2007). 
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2.6.1 Benefits of Information Sharing  
 
Under the (BOTaC), both parties share information about the project concerned and 
are share the same information and knowledge about the infrastructure project in 
question so as to ensure that they each respond to each other on the basis of having 
the same information. In the negotiation process each party expects to receive a 
share of the minimum and the maximum end and usually an equilibrium outcome is 
achieved at the end of the bargaining process.  The BOTcM suggest that any value 
TC within the interval is an effective concession solution that can protect the basic 
interests of both parties. The parties would then have to negotiate for a specific value 
within the interval through a bargaining process. According to the principle of the 
bargaining theory, each party will wish to gain maximum benefit as a result, when the 
lower boundary of the concession period is adopted, namely, TC = TC-L, the 
government side will gain maximum benefit from operating the infrastructure, while 
the investor will gain basic benefit i.e. the expectation on the basic return on 
investment. On the other hand, when the upper boundary of the concession period is 
adopted, namely, TC =TC-U, at this point , the stakes are high for the investors to 
generate maximum revenue through operating the infrastructure asset for a 
maximum period of concession, while the agency will only be able to protect the bare  
interests. The two players will continue to negotiate up to a point where they both 
achieve more or less equal benefits. The bargaining process induces costs with each 
bargaining round, as the offer is rejected and a counter offer is made, another round 
of bargaining is entered into and thus adding time to the project argued (Chen, Lin & 
Wang, 2012). Players are urged to guard against unreasonable offers as they bear 
with them bargaining time and value cost. It is advisable for the players to engage an 
agreement earlier in the process than later so as to smooth out any differences that 
can potentially hinder the progress of the project or hold it ransom (Shen et.al, 2007). 
 
The government (owner) opens the bargaining by offering a term that the investor will 
accept or reject the offer. Acceptance of a term would end the bargaining process 
otherwise the investor will propose a counter offer. The government may accept or 
reject the term but the acceptance thereof would end the bargaining process. The 
figure below illustrates that process. 
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FIGURE 2.1: THE BARGAINING PROCESS INVITED BY THE GOVERNMENT 
CONCERNED IN FORMING A BOT CONTRACT  
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 Accept 
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                                                                         Accept 
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                                                                      Counteroffer 
 
Source: Ho (2006) 
G= Government concerned 
I = Private Investor 
 
In reality, the agreement will never be reach at either points TC_L or TC _U the two 
players will bargain within an interval (TC_L,TC_U). As financial benefits are measured 
by the NPV that will be generated through operating the BOT infrastructure asset 
during the project‟s economic life, In order to avoid a compromised position, the 
parties will bargain on how to equitably share the total benefits. The figure below 
shows that the total benefits generated during the concession period interval namely, 
(TC_L,TC_U) is measured by NPV (Tf )-IR therefore, the way of sharing benefits, NPV (Tf )-
IR, need to be agreed upon by the parties at play. The will be put at bay until such 
time the two parties reach an agreement. The p a r t i e s  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  
n e g o t i a t e  until they reach to a point where both sides will receive some 
benefits that are more than or at least equal to their basic expectations. This 
negotiation process can be illustrated in Figure. 2.2 Where P denotes the private 
investor, G the government concerned. The bold curves denote various utility values 
G 
 I 
  G 
  I 
    End 
    End 
    End 
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to the private investor when different concession periods are adopted, and the 
thinner curves denote various utility values to the government.  
 
FIGURE 2.2: THE PROFILE OF THE UTILITY GAINS BY THE GOVERNMENT 
CONCERNED AND THE PRIVATE INVESTOR 
 
Source: Ho (2006) 
Tc is the agreeable concession period. In general, agreement will not be made at 
either point TC_L or point TC_U. The two players will bargain within the interval TC_L, 
TC_U. The rational behaviour bargaining theory holds that when the parties behave 
rationally, they will not easily give up for a best deal. The bargaining process will end 
when the two parties reach an agreement. It is to be noted however that either party 
has the right to invite the bargaining process, not only the government as illustrated 
in figure 2.1 above. In the interest saving, the party inviting the bargaining process 
should make a reasonable offer that will be informed by the analysis of the other 
party‟s position. If the offer on the table is not attractive enough, the other party will 
reject it and propose a counteroffer. Unreasonable offers from either side may result 
in both bargain and time costs which will affect the timing of the infrastructure 
provision. It is therefore pivotal for the parties to realise that the sooner they reach 
consensus, the sooner the project will take off.  
 
2.7  BOT PROJECT FINANCING  
 
BOT projects are financed by forming a Special Purpose Vehicle (an SPV) which is 
independent from project developers or promoters. There are two major concerns 
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derived from BOT project financing namely: (1) the return on investment for 
developers is measured through equity returns instead of the value of the firm or of 
the project since they fund the project by holding a significant portion of the shares of 
the BOT firm. (2) The BOT firm is subject to bankruptcy before the completion of the 
project. The traditional capital budgeting techniques focus on evaluating equity value 
and thus fail to capture the pay-off of the BOT developers. 
 
Since any failure in the delivery of a PPP project will cause a significant political cost, 
a rational government will do its best to avert any failures in the projects. Since the 
equity value of a BOT firm is closely related to bankruptcy probability of the 
government, the equity value is the most important evaluation criterion of financial 
viability which is less performed due to the constraints in skills availability. . In 
instances where the equity of the BOT firm is publicly placed, the project 
development failures are likely to cause political costs (Ho & Liu, 2002). National 
Treasury (2007) posits that in order for the BOT project to be passed, it first has to be 
politically accepted hence the political implications.  
 
The financial viability needs to be properly defined, in the event the negotiation with 
the government is taken up and yielded successful results, this option will be 
reflected in equity value. If the equity value is greater than the investment amount, 
the project will be erroneously considered as financially viable and vice versa. 
 
2.8  STAKEHOLDER ENGANGEMENT 
 
As mentioned above that the incentive for the government to utilise PPPs in the 
development and provisioning of public infrastructure and services is that it can 
experience rapid expansion at reduced pressure on the government‟s budget hence 
the employment of the PPPs need to be politically supported. Chen, Hubbard & Liao 
(2013) have noted that where PPP projects are concerned, the general public and 
the other stakeholders are seldom invited to partake in the processes as negotiations 
are inclined to be kept between the parties to the contract i.e. the government and 
the private service providers. In their work, Chen, Hubbard & Liao (2013) noted the 
dominance of the top-down imposition of private participation in some of the projects 
in Hong Kong where PPPs had turn into GPP meaning Government-Private 
Partnerships. In South Africa a similar situation was experienced with the e-tolling 
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project.  What the governments seem to overlook though is the existence of the 
social contract that is central to the citizenship which includes rights and obligations. 
The citizens exercise it by holding the providers of public service (the government) 
accountable for delivery through engagement in the following manner (1) registering 
their views or needs, referred to as “voice”; (2) choosing a service provider, referred 
to as “choice”. Both variables i.e. choice and voice depend on information available 
to the citizens but the information required for making the choice is limited to the 
information and alternatives that they have access to. The Information required for 
effectively voicing out their views is vast, up-to-date, accurate, relevant and in the 
form that is easily understandable to the citizens that they can respond to at any 
phase of the project. 
 
In order to motivate citizens in giving their voice and them to continue engaging, 
assurance need to be given that their voice will be heard and valued. Citizens can 
make their voice be heard through formal or informal means: formal being voting or 
representation in decision making bodies and informal means being through lobbying 
and protesting, which is not ideal. 
 
Both choice and choice Information required for voice depend on the information that 
is made available to the citizens. In formation required for choice on the one hand is 
limited to the alternatives that are available and also the access to them. Information 
required for voice on the other hand is vast and should be accurate, relevant and up-
to-date and in a format that the citizens will understand and respond to at any stage 
of the project. Citizens need to be assured that their voice will be heard and valued 
prior to engagement, without such assurance they will take a back seat. 
 
The figure below illustrates the routes of accountability of the service provider to the 
citizens regarding the project that is being undertaken: 
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Figure 2.3 Accountability of public service providers to citizens (short route) 
and via the state (long route) 
c
 
Source: Chen et al. (2013) 
 
The short route of accountability involves both their voice and choice. It also involves 
the due processes between the service provider‟s agency and the state.  
 
The character of governance in the society through the quality of due processes 
shapes the strategy and actions of the citizens in holding the providers of public 
service to the law and enforcing the policy by easing of available channels and 
accesses to information (openness). In an environment where openness, due 
processes and responsiveness exist, citizens are motivated to apply their voice 
through the long route accountability i.e. political, official, and legal channels (Wong, 
Liu & Cheng, 2011). Their strategy and actions will be those which offer them greater 
advantage in achieving their objective within the governance limitation of their 
society. 
 
The perceived efficiency of the PPPs has led to the assertive top-down approach in 
promoting the PPPs, because there is a perception that the government would save 
public funds the adoption of the PPP would therefore mean that standardised 
contracts are utilised. 
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With the long route, accountability relies on the due processes and a contract that 
exists between the government and service provider where it is common knowledge 
that transparency will be limited yet the consultation with the citizens is mostly 
confined to the willingness to pay surveys for individual projects and without any 
opportunity for voicing out their views.at no stage of the project are the citizens given 
an opportunity to voice out their views  even when due processes are followed non 
participation of citizens pose a risk that the commercial compromises made between 
the government and the private service providers would neglect the interests of the 
citizens. This is because due processes in their nature are more focused on the 
procedures than they are on the gains and losses. 
 
2.9  SUMMARY 
 
A successful project is one that properly allocates risks and returns among the role 
players in order to achieve suitable risk-return trade-offs. Ideally, a privately financed 
project should be self-sufficient/ supporting however, unattractive projects like EHC 
and WHC should be afforded government assistance (Ye & Tiong, 2007). Note 
should be taken that this support does not take a blanket approach, a number of 
factors such as investment environment, economic stability, political stability, and 
legal system are taken into consideration prior to application. A detailed feasibility 
study is also important in determining value for money of the project. 
  
A policy framework that supports the PPP project should be in place should be in 
place prior to the commencement of the project to ensure its success. When 
government puts good policy into place, investors become willing to invest without 
much protection from the government. According to Ye & Tiong (2007) in Pakistan, 
no single deal was concluded prior to the government issuing a policy framework that 
supports that project.  
 
Transparency plays a major role in the success of a project because once the 
opposition party or parties detect lack of transparency, favouritism and corruption, the 
project is likely not to succeed especially where the buy-in of the citizens was not 
obtained and they were excluded throughout the process. Government has a 
tendency of excluding the most important stakeholders i.e. the citizens and only 
involve them when they are supposed to pay tolls. 
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     CHAPTER 3 
 
    RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 focused on factors that influence the of infrastructure provisioning 
modality, the determination of project viability prior to embarking on it and 
factors to be considered in performing the value for money test. We have seen 
how projects fail when the value for money test for a project was not detailed 
and did not factor in uncertainties associated with large projects. Also of 
importance in chapter 2 were the processes entailed in the determination of the 
concession period, the longer the concession period the more attractive it is for 
the investors and vice versa, an agreement needs to be reached by both party 
prior to signing the contract.   
 
This chapter expands on the general research approach adopted by the 
researcher to arrive at the outcome of the study, this pertains to the research 
methodology which includes the research paradigm, the methodology that was 
adopted in the development of the empirical study as well as the data collection 
method that was employed. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research design also known as research paradigm is the overall strategies of 
reconciling the theoretical research problem to the pertinent empirical research 
with a view to ultimately arrive at a conclusion (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005 and 
Collins and Hussey, 2009). It is therefore imperative to for the research to be 
thorough, rigorous, systematic and address a specific problem. They pointed out 
that there are two main research paradigms which can be employed for data 
collection purposes namely: positivists (quantitative) and phenomenological 
(qualitative) paradigms which are a philosophical framework that offers guidance 
in the conduct of the research.  The research is designed in accordance with: 
- The purpose of conducting the study; 
- The data collection method and data analysis; 
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- The rationality of the research; and 
- The research outcome. 
 
3.2.1 Positivistic Approach 
Positivistic (also known as quantitative) approach investigates facts and or 
causes of phenomena which is the subject of the study and produce quantitative 
data through questionnaires, focus groups and experiments to confirm the 
observed phenomena whilst divorcing the subjective bias of the researcher from 
the reality of the study (Cooper & Schindler, 2001).  This research paradigm is 
less systematic and commonly involves hypothesis and testing (Hanson, 2008). 
 
3.2.2  Phenomenological Approach 
Phenomenological (also known as qualitative) approach seeks to understand 
people‟s perceptions and perspectives as well as their understanding of 
particular situations. It is usually difficult to quantify and relies mostly on the 
researcher‟s ability to decipher his/ her understanding of the phenomena  of the 
society. It investigates in addition to the what, when and where the why and how 
of the decision making hence a smaller but focused sample is required 
(Osborne, 2011) to produce subjective qualitative data that is perceived by 
Collins & Hussey (2009) to have low reliability. Even though there are two major 
types of research paradigms, some projects require a combination of both in 
order to better explain the phenomenon according to Leedy & Ormrod (2012) 
which method is referred to as triangulation.  
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TABLE 3.1 QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 
 Qualitative Research Quantitative* Research 
Objective 
/ purpose 
To gain an understanding of 
underlying reasons and motivations. 
To provide insights into the setting of 
a problem, generating ideas and/or 
hypotheses for later quantitative 
research to uncover prevalent trends 
in thought and opinion 
To quantify data and generalise 
results from a sample of the 
population of interest. To measure 
the incidence of various views and 
opinions in a chosen sample. 
Sometimes followed by qualitative 
research which is used to explore 
some findings further 
Sample Usually a small number of non-
representative cases. Participants 
selected to fulfil a given quota 
Usually a large number of cases 
representing the population of 
interest. Randomly selected 
participants 
Data 
collection 
Unstructured or semi-structured 
techniques e.g. individual depth 
interviews or group discussions 
Structured techniques such as on-
street or telephone interviews 
Data 
analysis 
Non-statistical Statistical data is usually in the 
form of tabulations. Findings are 
conclusive and usually descriptive 
in nature 
Outcome Exploratory and/or investigative. 
Findings are not conclusive and 
cannot be used to make 
generalizations about the population 
of interest. Develop an initial 
understanding and sound base for 
further decision-making  
 
Used to recommend a final course 
of action  
Source: Mabena 2012 
 
In the quest to gain a better understanding of the subject of study a quantitative 
method was employed.  
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The nature of the research warranted that the researcher follow the qualitative 
approach. Due to the nature of this research being highly subjective (Creswell et al, 
2015) and the research topic being of a sensitive nature in South Africa at the time of 
research, it was thought that at the time of the research no balanced view would be 
obtained from government representatives as a result the secondary empirical review 
proved to be a better approach to this research. The empirical review that was 
adopted albeit qualitative, it was more balanced. 
3.3   RESEARCH METHOD 
Research methodology talks to the overall approach of the research process, it 
pertains to the theoretical context as to how the data was collected and analysed 
(Creswell, Ebersohn, Eloff, Ferreira, Ivankova, Jansen, Niewehuis, Pietersen, Clark, 
& van der Westhuizen: 2015). In this study, the method that was applied is one that 
would ensure a balanced and objective view to the study. A qualitative approach that 
was illustrated by way of case studies was adopted as the qualitative would have 
been relatively difficult given that this was not an easy subject to handle.  
Due to the sensitive nature of this Gauteng e-toll and the non-publication of the report 
on its viability the researcher thought that the interviews with the senior state 
representatives if possible to conduct it would not yield a balanced view. It was then 
decided that a secondary empirical study approach would yield results that are 
closest to the true reflection of the status quo. 
3.3.1  Literature study 
A detailed literature study was conducted in chapter two where the importance of 
PPP and feasibility study was reviewed. 
3.4  THE SAMPLE 
 
In a descriptive research, the researcher would use a sample to study the 
characteristics of a fairly large population. A subset of the entire population is 
studied as it is not always possible to conduct a study on the entire population, then 
the results obtained from that study can be extrapolated over the entire population 
only if the sample is a true representation of the population (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010) 
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the researcher can however include the entire population in his/ her study when the 
population is small (Collins & Hussey, 2003)  
 
There are eight different approaches to sampling which fall into two major 
categories, namely: probability (objective) and nonprobability (subjective) sampling. 
 
3.4.1  Probability Sampling 
 
In probability sampling, each member of the population will be represented and 
stands an equal chance of being selected. The researcher needs to mention that 
prior to performing the sample selection (Evans, 2010 and Leedy & Ormrod, 2010).  
Leedy & Ormrod (2010) have tabled the following list specific random sampling 
techniques: 
 
Simple Random Sampling  
 
A simple random sampling technique is a least sophisticated sampling method and 
is practical for using in small populations where each member of the population 
stands an equal chance of being selected. 
 
Stratified Random Sampling 
 
Where the population has different layers of population with each having distinctly 
different types of characteristics stratified random sampling is ideal. The researcher 
will draw equal samples each layer of the total population. 
 
Proportional Stratified Sampling 
 
In proportional stratified sampling, the sample is not obviously segregated into 
different strata but a procedure is followed to ensure an equal representation in 
each stratum, firstly, members of each stratum are identified then a random sample 
is selected from each one.  
 
Cluster Sampling 
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When the population of interest is spread over a large are, it may not be feasible to 
make up a list that incorporates each member of the entire population. The area is 
then divided into heterogeneous clusters that are truly representative of the entire 
population. The sample will then be selected which consist of individuals from each 
of the clusters. 
 
Systematic Sampling  
 
Systematic sampling involves selecting individuals or clusters according to a 
predetermined sequence which must originate by chance e.g. selecting every 10 th 
unit on the list within the population. 
 
3.4.2  Nonprobability Sampling  
 
In a nonprobability differs from probability sampling in that there is no guarantee 
that each member of the population will be represented in the sample, some 
elements stand a little or no chance of being selected whilst others stand a very 
good chance of making it to the sample. 
 
3.4.2.1 Convenient Sampling  
 
Convenient sampling makes no claims about the representation of the population. It 
considers elements that are readily available. Convenient sampling is ideal for less 
demanding research problems. 
 
3.4.2.2 Quota Sampling  
 
Quota sampling is a variation of convenient sampling but differs in that it selects 
respondents in the same proportions that they are found in the general population 
e.g. select 20 respondents from each cluster. It is not done in a random fashion. 
 
3.4.2.3 Purposive sampling  
 
In purposive sampling, elements of the sample are chosen for a particular purpose 
e.g. a group of people who represent a diverse perspective on an issue.  
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3.5  SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter the research methodology that was employed in conducting the 
research study was discussed. Concepts such as research design and sampling 
were also discussed. 
 
The next chapter will analyse the case study in the quest to offer better 
understanding of the subject of the study.  
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     CHAPTER 4  
 
     IMPERICAL STUDY 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to achieve more realistic results this study adopted a secondary empirical 
study that was performed on the Malaysian projects since the report on the South 
Africa‟s e-toll was never published. It was decided that since most of the information 
pertaining thereto was based on opinions, any representative that would be 
selected for interviewing would be biased. It is for this reason that the study based 
its empirical review on the interview that was conducted in Malaysia with the 
Minister of Works to obtain a balanced view and to compare the different types of 
BOT projects that were carried out and also to compare the efficiency of projects 
procured under BOT schemes with projects that were procured using the Traditional 
procurement method. The comparison was done in the form of case studies that 
give the background of the projects as well as the facts of the case. 
 
4.2  Case Study 1: The North South Expressway (NSE) 
 
According to the study performed by Karim (2012), the North South Expressway is 
the largest project to date that Malaysia has ever procured through BOT scheme. 
The project was for constructing a 500 kilometre highway and rehabilitating an 
existing highway facility that is 370 kilometres long. The total project length was 870 
kilometres. The need for the project was informed by the study that was undertaken 
by the Malaysian government which indicated a heavy traffic on the three corridors 
of the federal road networks. Another congestion was noted in three other areas 
along the route namely: Penang, Klang valley and Johor Barhu. The NSE project 
was initiated by the government in 1977 with the actual construction work 
commencing in 1980 under the supervision of the Malaysia‟s Highway Authority 
(MHA). By 1985 the government had managed to complete 366 kilometres which 
was 36.6% of the 500 kilometres at the cost of RM 3.2 Billion (Santhiman, 2011 in 
Karim 2012). In 1985 a privatisation policy was launched by the Government of 
Malaysia (GoM). It was also around that time when the Malaysian economy 
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experienced the world economic recession together with the economies across the 
world. This made it difficult for the public funded project to thrive as the recession 
impacted the project directly. It is for this reason that the GoM decided to have the 
remainder of the project complete through PPP. The BOT method was an automatic 
choice for the GoM and it was decided that in order to enable the private investors 
to recoup their investment, the road would be tolled. 
 
An invitation was then made to the public for interested private sector companies to 
register their interest in carrying out the remainder of the two projects through the 
tendering system. Of the six (6) proposals that were received, three (3) were 
considered for further evaluation and their details were as follows 
 
TABLE 4.1 DETAILS OF PROPOSALS THAT WERE CONSIDERED FOR 
FURTHER EVALUATION 
 Private Company Names 
Bid 
Characteristics 
Pilecon Hashbudin UEM 
Bid Price RM 3.372 billion RM 3 billion RM 3.5 billion 
Financial support 
required from the 
government  
RM 498 million 
standby credit 
Government 
support for 
commercial loans 
RM 1.65 billion 
Proposed toll rate 
per kilometre 
7 sen 5 Sen  7.5 sen  
Proposed 
concession period  
25 years 22 years 25 years 
Estimated 
collection total  
RM 18-19 billion  RM 17.9 billion RM 34 billion 
Experience in 
highway 
construction 
 Yes Yes No 
Source: Karim (2012) 
 
Despite its lack of experience in the construction of highways, UEM was favoured 
above the experienced companies. It was also the highest bidder that also required 
the most government support. At face value UEM had the least chances of being 
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awarded the contract but it turned out the mostly favoured. The criteria used by the 
GoM for such an award was not disclosed to the stakeholders. The toll rate 
proposed by UEM per kilometre was the highest despite it being inclusive of the 
part of the NSE highway that was constructed by the GoM. This award sparked a lot 
of criticism from the public as well as the opposition party as the process lacked 
transparency. This was not only the largest project to ever be carried out but also 
the first BOT project to be executed in Malaysia. There was an imminent risk 
associated with the delivery of this project in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy as the appointed company did not have the requisite skill to undertake the 
project of this magnitude and also it was the most expensive in terms of the bidding 
cost. 
 
Having taken a heed of the criticism from the opposition party, the GoM put the 
following mitigation measures in place to help reduce the risk and to ensure the 
achievement of the higher objective i.e. a working road that complies to all the 
requirements of a highway: 
  The project was divided into 44 packages which had to be delivered in phases. 
Seasoned Contractors in the industry were appointed to run with the project. In 
the interest of performance, the GoM further offered the subcontractors payment 
option in the form of cash and equity shares which shares were convertible into 
voting shares. The purpose of intrinsic motivating factor was to ensure good 
quality output, being co-owners of the project, the contractors were expected to 
be diligent in the execution process. 
 By not offering the public a real alternative road, the GoM curbed the demand 
risk. People would be compelled to make use of the NSE as it was wider as it 
had about four (4) lanes, the not so alternative road that ran parallel the NSE 
had a single lane and was still experiencing congestion problems. The toll 
structure that differentiated vehicles according to their classes was also worked 
out and was incorporated into the concession agreement (CA) in a quest to 
minimise the demand risk. Also incorporated into the CA was the government‟s 
minimum revenue guarantees in the event the demand risk materialising. 
 The toll rates were tied to the price index fluctuation so as to mitigate the 
inflation risk. In order to curb the interest rate variability risk, the financing 
structure comprised 100% local currency and a government guarantee that 
limited the interest rate on loan to 20%.  
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The amount of protection and that the project subjected it to objections by political 
party. They cited that the lack of transparency amounted to corruption by the ruling 
party. Despite all the cushioning that was availed, the project still managed to incur 
project overruns of up to 70% which were not incurred when the NSE was run by 
the government. 
 
The table below shows how the same project compares in terms of economy and 
efficiency when it was run by the government through Malaysia‟s Highway Authority 
(MHA) and when it was delivered through a BOT scheme. 
 
TABLE 4.2 EFFICIENCY COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE NSE PORTION THAT 
WAS PROCURED THROUGH TPM AND THE PORTION THAT WAS PROCURED 
THROUGH PPP ARRANGEMENT 
DETAILS TPM PORTION PPP PORTION 
Length constructed 370 kilometres 500 kilometres 
Land acquisition costs Fully borne by government None (fully borne by 
government) 
Construction costs RM 3.32 billion Awarded at RM 3.5 billion 
incurred project overruns 
RM 2.5 billion  
Total cost RM 6 billion 
Construction period 5 years 5 years initial period plus 2 
years of project delay 
Project scope Construction, Operation 
and Management 
Construction, Operation 
and Management 
Source: Karim (2012) 
 
The prime objective of entering into PPP agreements for the provisioning of public 
infrastructure and service is to use it for the government to provide maximum public 
facilities through the employment of seasoned skill at reduced government 
budgetary strain while offering the public the social benefits associated with the 
project(s). This in above case study it was noted that a lot of unwarranted 
assistance with serious financial impact on the government‟s budget was offered to 
the private company. Despite the project being subdivided into 44 packages which 
were managed by contractors with solid experience, the project managed to be 
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completed 2 years behind schedule and at about RM 2.5 billion more than the 
budgeted cost yet the project scope was a mere 35% more than the portion that 
was produced through TPM yet the total cost of construction amounted to 80% 
more than the TPM procured portion. It can therefore be concluded that the project 
portion procured under the BOT scheme was more expensive and inefficient than 
the part that was produced using the in-house skill.  
 
The GoM encountered problems with the public as CA created an element of 
entitlement to upward adjustment of toll rates through the toll increase entitlement 
clause. The clause made a provision for a 6% increase in the first two consecutive 
years of operation. Because the public was excluded from the negotiations the 
government did not have its buy-in as a result the public made its voice heard 
through the vehement increase rejection. The government had to honour its part of 
the deal by offering government guarantees for those increases that could not be 
imposed to the public. 
 
4.3  Case Study 2: The Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway  
 
The Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway is the latest highway project in 
Malaysia that was provisioned through a BOT scheme arrangement. The project 
was awarded to Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Expressway Berhad in 1997 at the 
time when the Asian financial crisis was taking place. The project could thus not 
take off until it was reviewed in 2008 through a supplemental agreement that was 
concluded and signed with the government in 2008. 
 
The construction process took place in 2008 shortly after the signing and it was 
completed in June 2011. The 33 Kilometre highway provides a link between Kuala 
Lumpur and Selangor districts. The aim of its development was to ease the 
congestion that was experienced on federal route number 54, so it was an 
alternative route. The development of this project was initiated by the concession 
company and not the government that was an unsolicited proposal. 
 
After the government had performed feasibility studies on this project it was put on 
the tender process and the normal procedure was followed where interested parties 
registered their interest through the completion of tender documents and were 
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subjected to the evaluation process (open tender process). The due process was 
followed and other interested parties were considered for evaluation. The project 
was awarded to Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Expressway Berhad.  
 
The cost of the project was RM 958 million and was financed through both domestic 
and foreign funding. Upon completion in 2011, the traffic volume experienced per 
day amounted to 60 000 vehicles but as soon as the road was tolled, half of the 
traffic volume went back to the federal route number 54 and the daily traffic volume 
reduced to a mere 30 000 vehicles per day. The CA stipulated that the land 
acquisition costs would be borne by the concession company and that toll rates 
would increase every five (5) years and in the event of non-increase, the 
government would pay the concession company the difference between the 
baseline and the increase (or failed increase) and that payment would be treated as 
the concessionaire‟s revenue. 
 
In measuring the efficiency of this BOT project, a comparison was made between 
the Kuala Lumpur Kuala Selangor Highway and the East Coast Expressway which 
was developed using the Traditional Procurement Method (TPM). 
 
TABLE 4.3 COMPARISONS BETWEEN KUALA LUMPUR-KUALA SELANGOR 
HIGHWAY AND EAST COAST PHASE 2 
 
Details Kuala Lumpur-Kuala 
Selangor Highway (BOT) 
East Coast Expressway 
phase 2 (TPM) 
Project length 33 km 120km 
Contract Single Divided into 16 packages  
Land acquisition  RM 65 million (borne by 
the government to be 
repaid by the 
concessionaire) 
RM 97 million  
Project cost RM 958 million RM 1.44 billion 
Project duration 3 years 8 years 
Project scope  Design, construct, operate 
and maintain 
Construct 
Source: Karim (2012) 
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In as much as the Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor highway was relatively small, the 
execution of the project proves to have achieved the desired efficiency which could 
be attributed to the selection of the right concessionaire to deliver the project. The 
project itself might have not delivered as expected in terms of the traffic demand. 
 
4.4  Summary 
 
This chapter analysed the case studies that were presented together with the 
information that was obtained from the interview. The efficiencies and deficiencies 
that were noted will be discussed in detail in the next chapter where the root cause 
of deficiencies will be established and recommendations be made in order to try 
and close gaps that were identified. 
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     CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this chapter is to integrate the literature review with the outcome of the 
case studies (empirical findings) and to recommend processes that will help close 
the gaps that were identified in order to make a meaningful contribution to the 
efficiency of projects procured through BOT schemes. 
 
5.2  ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
The research problem that was mentioned in chapter one (1) pertained to the 
factors that led to the failure of projects procured through BOT schemes. A thorough 
literature review was engaged in an attempt to address the problem and also case 
studies were analysed in an endeavour to reconcile theory to practice and try to fill 
the gaps where there is an element of lack. 
 
5.3  INTERGRATION OF LITERATURE REVIEW WITH EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
 
The study revealed the following findings which are also factors that contribute to 
the failure of BOT projects: 
 
Finding (1) 
 
Regarding the NSE project, the project was awarded to UEM, a private company 
that was not only the highest in terms of cost, it also needed heavy government 
support and did not have any skill or experience related to the project that it had to 
carry out. 
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Discussion 
 
There was lack of transparency in the processed that led to GoM awarding the 
tender to UEM, there was also no engagement as a result the stakeholders were 
not privy to the criteria that was used in awarding the contract to the novice 
organisation which lacked a financial muscle. The citizens as usual, were not 
involved in the decision making process and at the end they were expected to pay 
tolls for the use of the road which was built in the most uneconomical way ever. 
 
Recommendation 
 
The government needs to be transparent in its processes in order to avoid bias and 
also to appear as being just and fair to all interest parties. 
 
Stakeholder engagement is crucial especially the engagement of the citizens as 
they will be expected to pay tolls at the end of the project. There is a general 
tendency of excluding citizens from decision making processes only to shift costs to 
them at the end of the project in the form of tolls (Chen, Hubbard & Liao, 2013).  
 
For a project to succeed its promoters need to confirm that project planning takes 
place within an enabling environment with sufficient political support and a buy-in of 
the stakeholders especially the community members need to be secured. The 
project has to be legally; economically; environmentally and  financially viable 
 
Finding (2) 
 
The failed Taiwan High Speed Rail Project  
 
The contract was negotiated in bad faith on the basis of limited information with the 
view of renegotiating the conditions of the contract upon winning the tender by 
asking for government subsidies and budgetary amendments, loan guarantees, 
asset purchase or government investment. 
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Discussion  
  
Such tendencies are expensive and are not good for the project. The 
concessionaires would do this knowing that it will be difficult for the government to 
re-advertise the tender once it has been awarded to the financial implications 
(Chen, Lin & Wang, 2012). This project was ultimately the government‟s burden in 
that it had to issue loan guarantees and cushion the project with a lot of subsidies. 
The government also contributed to the failure of this project by not performing 
thorough feasibility study. Failure to adequately identify and assess the project risk 
will always  in the mitigation measures that do not really talk to the risk at hand and 
will expose the government to unnecessary risks. A blanket approach cannot be 
applied on all projects, each project risk must be assessed on its own merits.  
 
Recommendation  
 
The agency should insist on the detailed feasibility study and value for money 
analysis prior to awarding a contract. A detailed study of qualitative and quantitative 
decision factors should be performed prior to embarking on a project to give 
reasonable assurance that value for money will be derived from a particular project 
although 100% guarantee can never be achieved at least a reasonable assurance 
to put every one‟s mind at ease and to give citizens the assurance that their money 
is wisely spent. 
 
There needs to be transparency in the due processes so as to minimise chances of 
corruption, all stakeholders need to be engaged in the decision making process in 
order to get their buy in. projects that do not have the support of the stakeholders 
are prone to fail. 
 
Finding (3) 
 
The Kuala Lumpur-Kuala Selangor Highway was an unsolicited project which the 
concessionaires made the proposal to the government having studied the situation, 
they viewed the highway as a response to the congestion that was being 
experienced at the time. 
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Discussion  
 
The project was efficient in that it was completed within the given time frames and it 
did no rely heavily on the government for financial assistance. What was disturbing 
about it was the fact that demand focus was not accurate and it did not see the 
predicted numbers in terms of the traffic volumes. The government then had to offer 
subsidies to make up for the shortfall. 
 
One would then ask the question as to the financial readiness of the government to 
incur such expenditure. It would boil down to the financial viability study if it was 
performed or not of if the factors used in its determination were relevant and/ or 
accurate. 
 
Recommendation  
 
Burger & Hawkesworth (2011) and Araujo & Sutherland (2014) warned that the 
government should always identify the need of the infrastructure asset to be 
procured. This will also help in determining the modality to be employed. The 
government ministry should play a gate-keeping role by determining t(1) the size of 
the project; (2) if the project will deliver value for money; (3) proper procedure to be 
followed in the development of the project; and (4) if the project is in line with the 
budget appropriation. Had these steps been followed, a better decision would have 
been derived with regards to the above project. 
 
5.4  RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
A Game theory Approach to be applied in order to ensure that all the bidders 
negotiate in good facts and disclose all the information. 
 
General recommendations based on the literature review 
 
The following are the caveats for successful BOT projects described by Cheng 
(2010): 
 An enabling regulatory framework to expedite the PPP strategy 
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A strong government support, stable legal framework e.g. an explicit National 
Development Policy that commits to promoting private sector participants 
UNIDO 1996 in Cheng (2010), efficient administrative framework, fair bidding 
procedures and a BOT transaction that is structured in a manner that is 
executable within reasonable time frames and costs.  
 Projects must prove to be financially sound, feasible and affordable. Financial 
structures should be such that they afford lenders adequate security, currency, 
foreign exchange rate and inflationary issues must be resolved and sponsors 
should have sound financial strength. The agency should create an environment 
that will offer foreign exchange rate risk, inflation rate risk, interest rate risk and 
demand risk guarantees.   
 Sponsors and contractors display an element of reliability and have the requisite 
experienced to carry out the project. The aspects of the project must be 
allocated rationally among the parties; and the parties to the contract need to 
cooperate on a win-win basis.   
 Efficient administrative framework must be put in place to facilitate projects and 
to expedite the process, authorisation processes need to be streamlined to help 
reduce red tape. 
 A long term working relationship needs to be forged by the contract parties.  
 A trust relationship that engages in joint decision making and production to help 
in the achievement of desirable outcomes  
 An enabling environment needs to be created to support the project, there must 
be sufficient political support for the project to succeed, also the environmental, 
social and stakeholder support are important for the success of the project.  
 
A mechanism that embraces trust building and joint learning elements in relation to 
PPP is crucial. Cheng (2010) coined an interface mechanism mechanism for 
promoting joint learning and trust building for the parties to the contract so as to  
enable them to efficiently coordinate with one another in dynamic process of BOT 
projects and is illustrated by the figure below: 
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FIGURE 5.1: THE INTERFACE MECHANISM 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cheng 2010 
The trust relationship between the two parties enhances: 
 The resolution of conflicts that may arise in the process 
 The apportionment of appropriate risks 
 Negotiations between the parties 
 Open communication   
 An understand one‟s roles and the ability to play it 
Trust is important for transparency, it minimises transaction costs as suspicions and 
second guessing are reduced.  
 
Policies supporting BOT project application be passed 
Dispute resolution processes should clearly be clearly outlined to save time (Chen 
& Messner, 2005)  
The bidding process should be transparent and not preclude competition 
 
  
 
 
Host Government  
(Government agency) 
Project companies 
(Strategic Alliances) 
Lender  
(Commercial banks) 
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5.5  CONCLUSION 
 
According to Arndt (n.d) the most common factor that lead to failure in PPP projects 
is the overestimation of the potential demand for services which also leads to 
overpricing of services by the private sector like it happened with the highway in 
Malaysia where UEM was granted the contract despite of it being the highest bidder 
and also quoted the highest toll rates, hence the choice of parameters to be used in 
the value for money assessment i.e. cost- benefit ratio. McCowan & Mohamed 
(2007) coined this as the inability by the project investors and owners to predict 
financial and non-financial factors associated with investment and to negotiate 
contracts that allow for these factors. 
 
An equitable and prudent risk allocation and management of risks amongst the 
stakeholders is vital to the success of such projects. It is necessary to predict 
common risks such as labour disputes, interruption in the supply of material, obtain 
certain approvals, etc. so that risk mitigation processes could be put in place to 
reduce the impact in the event risk occurring. 
 
Lack of transparency on the part of the agency regarding the awarding processes 
usually leads to unscrupulous private companies which in turn lead to the conditions 
of the contract being altered to accommodate the inefficiencies of the service 
provider. Project overruns are also bound to occur and so are the government 
subsidies and loan guarantees. Projects end up being far more expensive and 
inefficiently carried out only to have the tax payers being syphoned to make up for 
the losses incurred.   
 
Failure to engage important stakeholders such as community members for whom 
the infrastructure is intended to benefit is the worst mistake that can ever be made. 
They would either choke the project to a point where it is aborted, wait for the 
project to be completed then refuse to pay tolls or boycott the infrastructure and not 
use it. In some instances community members would go to the extend of protesting 
to show their discontent. 
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Because there is no relationship between the allocation of ownership and efficiency, 
efficiency in the operation of the asset,  it is against this backdrop that this paper 
recommends that in order to foster efficiency in the provisioning and operation/ 
management of a project/ infrastructure asset, Instead of have the procurement 
method as just Build-Operate and Transfer (BOT), BOT & tender BOT and O & M be 
considered as another alternative which will allow the agency to put the project on 
tender for operation at the end of the concession period in the event the agency does 
not have the requisite skill to operate and manage the project.  
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